


267189
JPRS-UPS-85-069

2 September 1985



USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

THE WORKING CLASS AND THE

CONTEMPORARY WORLD

No 2, March-April 1985

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USSR REPORT
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

THE WORKING CLASS AND THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD

No 2, MARCH-APRIL 1985

Except where indicated in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language bi-monthly journal RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNYI MIR published in Moscow by the Institute of the International Workers Movement, USSR Academy of Sciences.

CONTENTS

Friction With Western Allies During WW II Recalled (V.M. Kulish).....	1
Conservatism: The Theory and Practice of 'Social Revanchism' (A.A. Galkin).....	11
Bovin, Lukin Discuss 'Centers of Power' Theories (A. Ye. Bovin, V.P. Lukin).....	26
French Socialists' Rightward Turn Since 1982 Viewed (I.M. Bunin).....	38
Institute Reference Works on World Affairs Reviewed (M. Aparnikov).....	58
Table of Contents.....	69

PUBLICATION DATA

English title : THE WORKING CLASS AND THE CONTEMPORARY
WORLD No 2, March-April 1985

Russian title : RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNY MIR

Author (s) : See last page

Editor (s) : I. K. Pantin (chief editor); V. V. Aleksandrov; V. A. Bogorad; Yu. A. Vasil'chuk; A. A. Galkin; V. G. Gel'bras; Yu. A. Zhilin; M. O. Karamanov; B. I. Koval'; Yu. A. Krasin; I. M. Krivoguz; V. I. Martsinkevich; V. Ye. Mozhayev; M. F. Nenashev; A. M. Rumyantsev; V. N. Sedykh; T. T. Timofeyev; V. S. Shaposhnikov; K. K. Shirinya; N. V. Shishlin; A. E. Ekshteyn (deputy chief editor)

Publishing House : Izdatel'stvo "Progress"

Place of Publication : Moscow

Date of Publication : March-April 1985

Signed to press : 14 March 1985

Copies : 10,000

COPYRIGHT : "Rabochiy klass i sovremenyy mir", 1985.

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FRICION WITH WESTERN ALLIES DURING WW II RECALLED

Moscow RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNY MIR in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 85 pp 33-46

[Article by V. M. Kulish: "The Decisive Contribution of the USSR to the Defeat of Fascism"]

[Excerpt] "War is a continuation of politics. And politics also 'continues' DURING WAR!" stated V. I. Lenin.¹² The policy of the CPSU and Soviet Government during the war, along with solving problems of mobilizing the country's forces and resources and using them most effectively in the armed conflict with the enemy, was aimed at creating favorable international conditions and realizing them in the process of achieving victory. Most important of them was the consolidation and joint efforts of all the world's antifascist, democratic and progressive forces against the aggressors. The political objectives in this area were proclaimed in a radio address by I. V. Stalin on 3 July 1941. "The objective of this all-people's Patriotic War against the fascist oppressors is not only to liquidate the danger hanging over our country, but also to assist all the peoples of Europe who are suffering under the yoke of German Fascism. In this war of liberation we will not be alone. In this great war we will have allies in the person of the peoples of Europe and America...Our war for the freedom of our fatherland corresponds with the struggle of the peoples of Europe and America for their independence and for democratic freedoms. This will be a united front of peoples standing for freedom against enslavement and the threat of enslavement from the fascist armies of Hitler."¹³ The program outlined by the Soviet state is a direct continuation of its foreign policy, conducted since the day of its origin. In addition, it accounted for changes in the political and strategic situation in Europe and throughout the world which occurred by the time of Fascist Germany's attack against the Soviet Union. First, the Soviet Union, which over many prewar years had struggled persistently and consistently for the democratization of international relations and sought to achieve the creation of a system of collective security in Europe to prevent any aggression and organize a rebuff to aggressors, entered the war against the fascist bloc. Second, the Soviet Union possessed powerful military potential and strength, which enabled it to give a decisive rebuff to the aggressors. Third, an antifascist resistance movement took shape and gathered strength in the countries occupied by the fascist invaders and other European countries, including even the allies of Hitler's Germany, which gradually acquired substantial political and military importance and influence.

Finally, after the military defeat of France and destruction of Great Britain in 1940, the political influence of advocates of combatting the fascist aggressors grew stronger in the Western European countries and the U. S., and the influence of those circles which advocated making a deal with them was sharply reduced.

The problem of uniting all antifascist forces arose from the moment that fascism came upon the international arena and it became urgent at the very outset of World War II. One of the ways in which it was solved was through the formation of the anti-Hitler military coalition. However, those forces which rejected collective security measures proposed by the Soviet Union in the pre-war years turned out to be entirely bankrupt in their attempt to create a viable military and political alliance against fascist aggression. Having carried out over a number of years a policy of encouraging the actions of the fascist aggressors and making deals with them at the expense of other states (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and most of all the Soviet Union), they could not advance promising ideas or designate forces and resources which could have cemented their military alliance. Therefore, the coalition which they created fell to pieces under the blows of the German fascist armed forces, having failed even to take shape.

The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against the fascist bloc and its promulgation of the objectives and general program of the struggle, confronted the governments of Great Britain and the U. S. with the question of the need to set down their own political programs, which they did on 14 August 1941 in a joint document, known as the Atlantic Charter. It stated that they had no territorial aspirations and would not agree to any territorial changes not in agreement with the freely expressed desire of interested peoples. They underscored that both powers respected the right of all peoples to select their own form of government, that they would strive to restore sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples forcibly deprived of them. Both governments expressed the intention of achieving the "final destruction of Nazi tyranny." Afterwards such a peace was to be established as to enable all countries to live in security on their own territory. There must be no place for the use of force in relations among all states, and "those states which threaten or may threaten aggression" will be disarmed "all the way to the establishment of a broader and more reliable system of universal security."¹⁴ At the same time the Atlantic Charter also expressed the claim of both governments that they would implement the postwar international and internal settlement for all peoples in all corners of the world. The Soviet Union expressed its agreement with those principles of the Atlantic Charter which coincided with or were close to the principles of the Soviet statement, but she inserted qualifications which would not permit the charter to be interpreted to harm the freedom, independence, sovereignty or territorial integrity of any state or people. She again emphasized that the main task was to achieve the most rapid and decisive defeat of the aggressors, since only its accomplishment could lay the basis for relations of international cooperation and friendship, responsive to the needs and ideals of all freedom loving peoples. All this created the political basis for uniting an alliance of peoples and states in the struggle against fascist aggression.

On 1 January 1942 representatives of the USSR, U. S., Great Britain, China and 22 other states signed the United Nations Declaration in Washington, which outlined the basic objective of the alliance which they had formed -- to achieve total victory over the fascist aggressors, necessary to protect the life, freedom and independence of peoples. They committed themselves to use all resources, military and economic, against those members of the fascist triple alliance and its allied states, with which any state participating in the Declaration was in a state of war. Each participant committed itself to cooperate with the other signatory states and not to conclude a separate truce or peace with the enemies. Later, during the war, the number of participants in the Declaration grew constantly. Already by Spring 1942, 29 states with a combined population of 1.2 billion people opposed the fascist bloc.¹⁵ The anti-Hitler coalition was basically completed by mid-1942. The coalition, despite the differences of its member states and inherent sharp, at times fundamental contradictions and disagreements, became a stable international political basis for cooperation among its participants in waging the war against the fascist bloc.

The principle problem of their cooperation was that of organizing joint and coordinated actions, most of all by armed forces, against the common enemy. Solving this problem turned out to be an extremely difficult process, due to the duplicitous and contradictory aims of the war, stated by the governments of the most powerful countries allied to the USSR -- the U. S. and Great Britain -- in the Atlantic Charter. In the practical actions of both governments, the accent in their policy shifted decisively to solving tasks of establishing Anglo-American supremacy or, in their terminology, world leadership. Here is what British Prime Minister Churchill wrote on this issue to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, on 8 January 1942: "No one can foresee what will be the correlation of forces and where the victorious armies will end up at the end of the war. However, it is possible that the United States and British Empire will be far from exhausted and will be economically and militarily the most powerful bloc that the world has ever seen, and that the Soviet Union will need our help to restore its country to a much greater extent than we will need her help."¹⁶ A similar objective was followed by the American government in its "Program for Victory." It stated: "National objectives, as defined by the conditions of the war, envision: 1) preserving the integrity of the whole Western Hemisphere; 2) preventing the collapse of the British Empire; 3) preventing further expansion of Japanese rule; 4) restoring in Europe and Asia a balance of forces under favorable circumstances, which facilitates future political stability in these areas and U. S. security; 5) establishing, in so far as practicable, regimes favorable to free enterprise and individual freedom."¹⁷ In setting the objective of achieving a balance of forces in Europe advantageous to American imperialism, the American government tried to have both Germany and the Soviet Union weakened by the war, and to see that a strong and independent France would never be reborn.

Along with such a noticeable duplicity of emphasis in the activity of the U. S. and British governments, the contradictory nature of relations of the leaders of both countries with the USSR as a wartime ally had a significant impact on their policy. On the one hand, they were interested in her participation in the war in order to exploit her conflict with Fascist Germany

for maximum possible advantage to themselves, and on the other hand they did not believe the Soviet Union could withstand the strikes of the German armies and not capitulate. For example, U. S. Secretary of Defense Stimson, based on evaluations and conclusions of American headquarters, reported to President Roosevelt that "Germany will be substantially occupied a minimum of a month and a maximum , possibly, of three months with the task of defeating Russia."¹⁸ British chiefs of staff were still more pessimistically inclined. At the end of June 1941 they reported to their American colleagues that, in their opinion, the German troops would require "at least three and at most six weeks or more" to seize the western part of the Soviet Union, including all of the Ukraine and Moscow."¹⁹ They repeated almost word for word the assertion of Hitler's Minister of Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop, who believed that Soviet Russia "will disappear from the map of the Earth eight weeks" after the start of the attack.²⁰ Churchill also wrote in his memoirs about such moods of military leaders and politicians in Great Britain and the U. S.: "Almost all authoritative military specialists believed that the Russian armies soon would suffer defeat and would be basically destroyed...President Roosevelt was considered a very bold man when in September 1941 he stated that the Russians would hold the front and that Moscow would not be taken."²¹ Based on such assessments, political and military leaders in both countries considered the time in which, in their opinion, German forces would be busy on the Soviet-German front, as a "gift of Providence," "an unforeseen and valuable breather" and counted on using it to increase their military forces and strengthen their positions in North and West Africa, Egypt and Libya and create American military bases in the Azores Islands, Iceland and other areas of the Atlantic Theater of Military Operations. Churchill wrote to his naval minister on 10 July 1941: "If the Russians can hold out and continue military operations if only until the start of winter this would give us incalculable advantages. As long as the Russians continue to fight it does not matter where the front line runs."²² U. S. and British leaders thought defeat or significant weakening of the strength of the Soviet union was possible even later, in Summer 1942, and even Summer 1943.

Of course, in the relations of the U. S. and British governments to the Soviet Union as their military ally, the decisive role was not so much emotion and their perception of the situation on the Soviet-German front and desire to accept that which they wanted as true, as it was cold, rather, cynical calculation. There were influential forces in both countries who viewed Fascist Germany as "the only bulwark against Bolshevism." And Churchill did not conceal the fact that he was a "consistent enemy of Communism," and he called the Soviet Union nothing other than a "gloomy, evil Bolshevik state," which he "once tried to strangle at birth and right up to the appearance of Hitler...he considered his deadly enemy."²³ He justified Great Britain's military alliance with the hated socialist regime to his confederates as mandatory and extremely necessary in the face of the fatal threat to the British Empire from Hitlerism. The "world drama" which had unfolded, in his words, forced him to place his anticommunism "on the back burner." For the same reason, U. S. ruling circles held the opinion that: "We are not for communism, but are against everything that Hitler is for."²⁴ The majority of these circles, and the most influential ones, came to the conclusion that to achieve the objectives of American imperialism and ensure the security of the United States it was necessary to destroy Hitlerism. They also calculated

that even with Great Britain, but without the Soviet Union, they would be unlikely to succeed in coping with Fascist Germany, which possessed a powerful military machine and the resources of almost all of Europe.

The duplicity of U. S. and British policy stipulated the duplicity and inconsistency of their activity in the area of organizing military cooperation and coordination with the Soviet Union in the struggle against the common enemy. This was manifested most fully in their decision on the question of opening a second front, and no less in their execution of deliveries of weapons and other materials to the Soviet Union.

They postponed solving the problem of the second front in Europe year after year until 1944. But, as a rule, the leaders of the U. S. and Great Britain did not notify the Soviet Government in advance about this. To the contrary, each time they sowed illusions that the introduction of allied armies onto the continent of Europe was planned and would take place very soon. Then they reported that the time periods were pushed back, giving various reasons, mostly having nothing to do with their true plans and considerations. In fact the U. S. and British governments implemented their plans of accumulating forces and creating and strengthening strategic bridgeheads in key regions of the world, most of all in Africa, the Mediterranean Sea, Southwest Pacific Ocean and the North Atlantic, which could be used at the most suitable moment of World War II, and especially afterwards, to assert their supremacy. Only at the end of 1943, after the Battle of Kursk, when it became obvious that the Soviet Union, despite all the burdens of war, was continuing to build up its forces, and that the power of the Fascist Bloc had already passed its peak and started to ebb, did the attitude of American and British leaders toward the question of opening a second front in Europe change.

On 18 November 1943 the American chiefs of staff presented to the President their prognosis of the strategic situation in Europe for 1944. Having noted that the correlation of forces on the Soviet-German front already was 3:2 in favor of the Red Army in 1943, they indicated that "the pressure developed and maintained by the Red Army exceeded all German expectations, and that German losses in people, resources and territory were much greater than assumed."²⁵ This time they already started to prognosticate the rapid defeat of Fascist Germany. This made a significant impression on the U. S. President. The American leadership held a firm position concerning the invasion of allied armies from the British Isles into Northwestern Europe. They rejected all attempts by the British leaders to convince them that it was necessary to continue the main actions of Anglo-American troops in the south of Europe -- Italy and the Balkans -- in order to forestall the entry of the Red Army into the Danube River Valley and Central Europe.

The invasion of the continent of Western Europe began on 6 June 1944 from the British Isles to Normandy, and on 15 August in the south of France. For more than four years the two greatest capitalist powers, the U. S. and Great Britain, built up and prepared their armed forces, weapons of all types and material resources, expending merely a miserly part of them in limited operations carried out in areas far removed from the vitally important strategic centers of Europe. Now against a Fascist Germany weakened by war, they pushed forward in the West the allied expeditionary forces, imposing in

structure and technical equipment, which were many times superior to the German forces in France, counting on demonstrating their strength and influencing the peoples of the whole world, weakening or neutralizing thereby the growing international authority of the Soviet Union. The amphibious assault operations in both invasion areas were successful, but then the battles in Normandy dragged out for two months. Only by autumn did the American, British, Canadian and French armies reach the approaches to the western borders of Germany.

In December 1944 German troops undertook an offensive in the Ardennes, having thrown back opposing American armies and created a critical situation on the whole Western Front. In any case it was so judged by the western allies. The U. S. and British leaders requested assistance of the Soviet Supreme High Command which, considering the serious position of the allied armies in the Ardennes, changed the start of a general Red Army offensive from 20 to 12 January 1945. The offensive developed successfully on all axes. It forced Hitler's high command to remove its forces, most of all the most combat effective tank divisions, from the Western Front and transfer them to the East. Moreover, it finally buried all of Hitler's offensive plans on the Western Front. Having recovered from the Ardennes shock, the allied armies renewed the offensive to the east and continued it until meeting the Red Army at the Elbe.

As for the assistance which Great Britain and the U. S. rendered to the Soviet Union, first of all it came very late. In the most difficult months of the war in 1941, when Soviet forces fought on the entire front against an enemy armed with the latest word in equipment, the western allies only carried out talks about deliveries and considered the question of whether weapons delivered to the Soviet Union would fall into the hands of Fascist Germany, since they doubted that the Red Army could withstand the enemy blows. In the second place, the amount of aid was incomparably small against the burden which the Soviet Union carried in a war against a common enemy. For example, during the war the USSR produced 489,900 guns, 102,500 tanks and selfpropelled artillery pieces and 136,800 aircraft, and received from the U. S. and Great Britain 9,600 guns, 11,567 tanks and selfpropelled guns, and 18,753 aircraft (14,013 of them transport aircraft).²⁶

The intentions and plans of U. S. and British ruling circles were no secret to the Communist Party and Soviet Government. They knew well that along with a true desire of the broad popular masses of many countries, including the U. S. and Great Britain, for alliance with the USSR and joint combat against the common enemy, antisoviet tendencies also had their place in the policy of the ruling circles of both countries. That these circles would honorably fulfill their alliance duty toward the USSR could not be counted on. But the party and government considered it necessary to enter into coalition with the capitalist states, and to show concern that the alliance become stronger and increase the effectiveness of its actions through the whole war. They were guided in this by Lenin's instruction that victory in battle against a powerful enemy "is possible only with the most intense efforts and with mandatory, most painstaking, thoughtful, careful and able use of any, even the slightest, "crack" among the enemies and any variance of interests among the bourgeoisie of various countries, among groups or types of bourgeoisie within

individual countries, as well as any, even the slightest, opportunity to get oneself a mass ally, even if temporary, wavering, unstable, unreliable and conditional. He who has not understood this has not understood a grain of Marxism and of scientific, modern socialism in general."²⁷

The activity of the Soviet Union in creating and strengthening the antifascist coalition was a natural and direct continuation of its policy of creating a system of collective security, which it carried out immediately before World War II, and which was aimed from the very outset against the fascist aggressors. The plans of the Hitlerite leadership to put the Soviet Union in a position of international isolation, frighten the ruling circles in the western countries with the "Soviet threat" and present fascism as a bulwark against communism, were destroyed. Its hopes of heading a "crusade" against the USSR, or at least of obtaining the support of the largest imperialist powers in the war against the socialist state were not borne out.

The peaceloving foreign policy of the Soviet government and its consistent struggle to prevent fascist aggression in Europe in the pre-war period, on the one hand, and the openly predatory policy of Fascist Germany on the other, had a significant influence on the political policy of the U. S. and British governments, which already in the first days of the attack by Fascist Germany against the USSR expressed firm readiness to conclude an alliance with the USSR. No less important to the course and outcome of the war was the fact that Soviet participation in the antifascist coalition ensured the consistency and irreversibility of its just, liberating nature throughout the whole war against the bloc led by Hitler's Germany. By its active, liberating foreign policy activity and its international authority and might, the Soviet state limited the opportunity for the U. S. and Great Britain to implement imperialist elements and tendencies in their international policy. In any case, they had to carefully hide and camouflage their unjust and predatory intentions and actions, and frequently even refrain from implementing them.

The just and liberating nature of the war waged by the antifascist coalition which the Soviet Union constantly and consistently struggled to preserve, was manifested in the fact that the popular masses of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Albania, France, Belgium, Norway and many other countries became its participants. Along with the official, legally based alliance between the USSR and member states of the antifascist coalition, there arose an unofficial alliance, not based on law but no less permanent, between our country and all participants in the Resistance Movement. The antifascist coalition became not only a coalition of states, but also a coalition of peoples.

The Resistance Movement arose in the fascist occupied European countries back in 1939-1940. But after Germany's attack on the Soviet Union it became stronger and more active. The forms of struggle for freedom and independence used by the peoples of the countries enslaved by fascism varied -- from actions by underground groups, sabotage and strikes, to mass partisan struggle and the creation of national liberation armies. The people's democratic thrust in this struggle was dominant, and in a number of countries supreme. Its nature was determined by the fact that both urban and rural workers, intelligentsia, and petty and some middle bourgeoisie took part in it. A special role belonged to the working class, which, under the leadership of the

communist parties, demonstrated exceptional staunchness, true patriotism, an understanding of national interests, and irreconcilability toward the fascist invaders and their henchmen. Communists pressed for cohesion among all forces in their countries interested in chasing out the invaders and for joint actions with antifascist forces of other peoples. The people's democratic nature of the Resistance Movement was also determined by the goals of its struggle. It was directed against the occupiers and their minions, for realizing broad popular democratic transformations in their countries, as well as excluding those phenomena and elements in domestic life and international relations which led to the capitulation of the bourgeois governments in the face of fascism. The leading role of the communist parties in the Resistance Movement was at this time manifested by the fact that they led the struggle of the popular masses not only for national, but also for social liberation. Owing to such decisive and consistent goals, and to the massive nature of the Resistance Movement in Yugoslavia, Poland, Albania, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, France, Belgium, Italy and Greece, it grew into popular uprisings, and in some countries even into socialist revolutions. Popular uprisings and even civil wars arose in the process of the national people's liberation struggle in a number of Asian countries: Vietnam, North Korea, China, Burma, Malayya, the islands of Indonesia and others. The Soviet Union actively supported the Resistance Movement and gave it assistance.

The Soviet Union's consistent struggle to realize the just and liberating objectives of the war against the fascist bloc and a postwar world structure based on democratic principles had great importance for the national liberation of enslaved peoples. The Soviet Union defended the right of each liberated people to decide itself the question of its social and state structure, without interference from outside. Under conditions of the fundamental turning point in the war, in November 1943 the Soviet Union promulgated its program for democratic resolution of the problems of post-war peaceful settlement. Its main principles were these: 1) liberation of the peoples of Europe from the fascist invaders and assisting them in restoring their national governments; 2) granting liberated peoples the rights and freedoms to solve themselves the question of their form of state structure; 3) strict punishment of war criminals; 4) creation of the necessary conditions to prevent the possibility of new aggression from Germany; 5) achieving long-term economic, political and cultural cooperation among the peoples of Europe.²⁸

The Soviet Government consistently carried out the principles of its program at all conferences and meetings of the three great powers, in relations with Resistance forces and in talks with countries liberated from fascist enslavement. It opposed plans of the U. S. and British governments, which envisioned creating federal associations of small states in central and southeastern Europe, which would mean remaking the map of Europe in the interests of American and British imperialism and imposing alien regimes upon the liberated countries. The treaties with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia concluded by the Soviet Union on friendship, mutual assistance and post-war cooperation, and the treaty on alliance and mutual assistance with France, facilitated the restoration of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of these countries. The Soviet Union had decisive influence on the allies' development of political and economic policy principles toward defeated Germany. The agreement made at the Berlin Conference provided for

the total demilitarization of Germany, the destruction of the National Socialist Party, its branches and subordinate organizations, disbanding of all Nazi institutions and ensuring that they do not revive in any form, preventing any Nazi or militaristic activity, revocation of Nazi laws, punishment of war criminals and those who took part in planning or implementing Nazi measures which entailed war crimes, and encouraging the activity of democratic political parties.²⁹ These decisions enabled the complete elimination of fascism in Germany and her development on the democratic path. The decision made at the Berlin Conference concerning the eastern borders of Germany created favorable conditions for establishing a stable peace in Europe.

The Soviet renewal of diplomatic relations with Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary gave the peoples of these countries fraternal support in creating and strengthening a people's democratic system and removed these states from international isolation. This also defeated attempts of U. S. and British ruling circles to achieve "reorganization" of the governments in the countries of central and southeastern Europe, in order to restore bourgeois rule in them. The policy which the Soviet Government followed was a concrete application of the principles of solving democratically the issue of peaceful post-war structuring of international relations, and it prepared the soil for the conclusion of peace treaties based on democratic principles with Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland and Italy.

Thus, the USSR's victory in the war greatly strengthened its international position. It created a new correlation and distribution of forces in Europe and throughout the world, and demonstrated the ever growing role of socialism and the Soviet State in the democratic resolution of international problems. While in the pre-war period the capitalist powers were forced to take the Soviet Union into account in solving international issues, after our victory in the war it became impossible to solve a single serious international problem without direct Soviet participation, or failing to take into consideration the positions of the USSR and other socialist states.

The victory of the USSR saved the Soviet peoples and all mankind from the threat of fascist enslavement. It opened for many nations the path to free and democratic development and progress. In the same way the Soviet people demonstrated their international solidarity with the workers of all countries.

World War II disclosed utterly the reactionary, anti-popular and historically doomed nature of capitalism, and aggravated all of its contradictions. It had as its consequence the departure of a number of states from the capitalist system and the formation of the world socialist system, and it gave a powerful uplift to the national liberation movement of the peoples in the colonies and dependent countries. Imperialism lost its domination over a large part of mankind, and the growing and strengthening world socialist system is having ever more influence on the development of international events toward peace, progress and the freedom of peoples.

FOOTNOTES

12. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 30, p 187.
13. "Vneshnyy politika Sovetskogo Soyuza v period Otechestvennoy voyny" [Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union in the Period of the Patriotic War], Vol 1, Moscow, 1946, p 34.
14. Ibid., p 167.
15. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of the Second World War 1939-1945], Vol 4, p 474.
16. W. Churchill, "The Second World War," Vol III, London, 1950, p 616.
17. M. S. Watson, "Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations," Washington, 1950, p 356.
18. R. Shervud, "Ruzvel't i Gopkins glazami ochevidtza" [Roosevelt and Hopkins Through the Eyes of an Eye Witness].
19. Ibid., p 496.
20. Ibid., p 497.
21. Churchill, op. cit., p 350-351.
22. Ibid., p 351.
23. Ibid., Vol 1V, p 428.
24. R. Shervud, "Ykaz. soch." [Selected Works], Vol 1, pp 495, 498-499.
25. "Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. The Conference at Cairo and Tehran, 1943." Washington, 1961, p 221.
26. "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna" [Second World War], Book 1, Moscow, 1966, p 29.
27. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 41, p 55.
28. "Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union in the Period of the Patriotic War," Vol 1, pp 118-119.
29. "Teheran - Yalta - Potsdam. Collected Documents." Moscow, 1971, pp 387-389.

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CSO: 1807/0336

CONSERVATISM: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 'SOCIAL REVANCHISM'

Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNIY MIR in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 85 pp 68-79

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[Text] Specialists recorded the phenomenon of a "conservative wave" as far back as the mid-1970's.

By this was meant the noticeably increased activeness of conservative ideologues, as well as the inclination of bourgeois parties on the right flank of the political spectrum to resort to arguments borrowed from the traditional or modified conservative arsenal.

Today in the mid-1980's it is ever more obvious that the term "neo-conservative wave," although it did correctly reflect what had taken place, was not accurate enough. Such a characterization of the tendencies displayed assumed that it was a short term phenomenon which, rolling like a wave against the ideology which took shape in bourgeois society in the post-war decades, would just as quickly rush back, without having changed the former situation in principle.

The decade which has passed since the "conservative wave" was first noted showed that we are talking about a process more stable and deep than was imagined at the time. As a result of this process, important changes occurred in the ideological model which was dominant in the developed capitalist zone at least since the mid-1950's. Their most characteristic trait was fundamental changes in the hierarchy of preferences given by the ruling class to various ideological trends. Whereas in prior years, when progressive economic development in the zone of developed capitalism was typical, the most honored place in this hierarchy belonged to bourgeois liberalism and closely related social reformism, from the moment of the sharp aggravation of the economic, and consequently, social and political problems of modern capitalism, conservatism, in both its traditional and modernized (neo-conservative) form, has held first place firmly and, apparently, for a long time.

Of course, the restructuring of the dominant ideological model took place in various ways in different countries, depending on the circumstances. And the tempo of this process in no way always coincided. Therefore, one can always find and cite examples which supposedly contradict that stated above.

Nevertheless, if one takes the zone of developed capitalism as a whole, the fundamental direction of movement in the dominant ideology is beyond doubt. Conservatism has gained determining positions in official social science and been propagated in mass intellectual circles. Conservative ideas occupied the dominant place in the political documents of the bourgeois parties, not only those of the right, but also centrist parties. Moreover, some traditional conservative views began to penetrate into the system of values of that part of society which long gravitated to the left flank and rejected conservative postulates.

Obviously this phenomenon requires scientific interpretation, and first of all it is necessary to clarify the causes of these events. Such attempts have been undertaken repeatedly. But since explanations of the reasons for the changes are inseparably linked with value judgments about the process, differences in assessments became fundamental and ideological from the outset.

Conservatives themselves characterize the changes in the dominant ideological model as a process of ideological "cleansing" of bourgeois society, which had finally acquired the ability to "shake off" alien reformist and utopian fetters imposed by "liberal intellectuals," and as a return to the "healthy values" of the past, and not capitalism distorted by "social experiments." Bourgeois and social-reformist critics of conservatism occupy an intermediate position. They boil the matter down primarily to a "pendulum effect." According to their views the lengthy dominance of the liberal reformist ideological model caused wear and tear, and thereby stimulated searches for something else. As a result the ideological pendulum swung to the right, having stimulated interest in conservative views. After a time, disappointment in the conservative ideological model will result in a movement back to the liberal-reformist model.

The Marxist approach, as is known, does not ignore the importance for ideological processes of autonomous development in the sphere of consciousness itself and social psychology. Obviously such development played its role in this case as well. Nevertheless, it must be seen that changes in the ideology of the ruling class, and correspondingly in social ideology as a whole, are based on changes taking place in the base structures. In this sense the ideological restructuring about which we spoke above is an indirect reflection of those economic and social upheavals characteristic of "modern capitalism."¹

Analysis of the changes in the dominant ideological model, accomplished from this point of view, may have as its object various aspects of this process: a typology of conservatism; its gnosiology; changes in mass consciousness; their link with social and economic upheavals and background events, etc. Only one of these aspects will be examined below: the place of conservatism as an instrument of the policy of "social revanchism," implemented by the ruling class in the current phase of the crisis of capitalism.

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In the works of conservative theoreticians there are always several postulates which, in the aggregate, represent something which could be characterized as a

system of modern conservative values. Their enumeration alone gives an impression about the social forces and interests which these views reflect.

They are based on the conviction:

-- of the hopeless imperfectability of human nature, which under a veneer of civilized conduct always conceals unreason and sinfulness;

-- of the limitation of the sphere of human reason and, consequently, the importance of universal moral order, sanctioned and supported by religion, and of the special role which belongs in this regard to traditions, institutions, symbols, rituals and even prejudices;

-- of the unreliability of progress in view of the limitations on forward movement of which society is capable;

-- of the natural, physical and mental inequality of people;

-- of the need for social classes and groups, and thus of the folly of attempts to achieve social leveling through the force of law;

-- of the imperfection of majority rule, which is subject to errors and to potential tyranny, and in connection with this, of the desirability of dispersing and balancing political power;

-- of the need for the active participation of the aristocracy in government;

-- of the most important role of private property as a guarantee of personal freedom and social order.²

In other words, the conservative approach to social problems is based on an orientation toward economic, social and political inequality, and in connection with this, toward the creation of social structures called upon to ensure this inequality by granting dominant positions to some "chosen minority."

The class meaning of this approach is still more obvious upon analysis of the specific economic, social and political programs which conservative forces advance.

Conservative theoreticians criticize the state of the contemporary capitalist economy. Its defects, revealed in recent years, are severely condemned in their works. More than this. Frequently the economic difficulties which the capitalist world now faces are portrayed so absolutely that a more somber impression is created than dictated by the objective course of affairs.

Against what is conservative criticism mostly directed? The primary ill, in the conservatives' opinion, is that over the course of several decades the developed capitalist countries have not lived within their means. As a result of this, a tremendous indebtedness has accumulated everywhere, which threatens financial and overall economic stability. High taxation substantially reduced the incentives for capital investments, and the social security system caused

a decline in labor morale. In turn the growth in the economic role of state institutions, which were subject to precipitous bureaucratization, undermined the ability of economic organisms to adapt to the rapidly changing world economic situation.

The blame for this development, naturally, is placed on the political opponents: depending on the country, on the left centrist, bourgeois reformist or social reformist parties. Their policy of social maneuvering, aimed at reducing class confrontation through concessions to the working masses, is called either impermissible spinelessness, or unconscious (and sometimes even conscious) complicity with socialism.

It is easy to see that many characteristics of the capitalist economy given by the conservatives are completely justified. The economic difficulties which it is experiencing are more serious than ever before in the post-war years. And this is acknowledged now not only by the consistent enemies of capitalism, but by all who have anything to do with it. So the conservative criticism of the economic situation in the capitalist countries can hardly be considered at all original. Nor are the conservatives original in their attempts to declare the defects characteristic of capitalism as a social system to be the result of incompetence, mistakes, etc. The specifics of their positions become apparent when the measures to be taken in order to bring the economy out of the dead end in which it finds itself are discussed.

The theoretical basis for most of the advice offered by conservatives is so-called "supply-side economics", which is the child of a group of conservative American economists -- Laffer, Gilder, (Vanniska) and a number of extreme right-wing members of the U. S. Congress who are close to them (Kemp, Roth and others). In the last few years the advocates of "supply-side economics" have also gained firm positions among bourgeois economists in the Western European countries.

The core of the concept of "supply-side economics," which contrasts with Keynesian "demand economics," is the thesis that capitalists, who fulfill most important economic functions, especially investing a large share of their incomes in production, form the active engine of society. Therefore, the basic task of an intelligent economic policy must be to guard wealth from all possible infringements, including those which take on the form of taxes. Since taxes are unavoidable, the only acceptable tax system is considered to be one in which the higher the income level the lower the tax rate. Facilitating the formation of free capital, such a system stimulates the "supply of capital," and thereby contributes to economic growth.⁵

For the same purpose, "supply-side economics" demands ending governmental control over prices, rescinding the guaranteed minimum wage, eliminating state control over the condition of the environment, etc.

"The richest American citizens, as a rule, are convinced that taxes on the highest incomes are too high," states ironically John Galbraith, well-known American liberal economist. "It has always been so. In our day, unfortunately, it is impossible to demand a reduction of taxes on high incomes merely because those who possess them would like to have more money to spend.

Therefore, the rich are required to seek out serious motives. Reducing the taxes on their expenditures must seem to be a benefit for all of society."⁴

The orientation of "supply-side economics" toward reducing taxes on high incomes has made it especially difficult to answer the question: What about the huge national debt under these circumstances, which the conservatives themselves characterize as the greatest threat to economic and political stability? So far there are two variants of an answer. Since expenditures for military objectives, in the opinion of the conservatives should not only not be touched, but, to the contrary, be increased, the target of reduction must be expenditures for social needs (social security, pensions, unemployment benefits, education, medical and other assistance). Reducing expenditures in this sphere is viewed not only as a means of restoring a balanced budget, but also as a self-contained social good: a form of stimulating labor activeness and morale (i.e., "labor supply").

The second variant derives from the belief that reducing taxes on the wealthy, which stimulates capital investment and, consequently, increased production, will result not in a reduction, but an increase in aggregate state revenues, since the lower tax level will be applied to higher incomes.

The so-called "Laffer Curve" is used to support this thesis. It demonstrates a changing dependency between tax rates and the amounts of tax revenues. According to this curve, when such tax rates are increased the amount of deductions first increases, then stabilizes and later begins to fall. In serious economic literature, including bourgeois, the Laffer Curve, even in the most favorable respect, is viewed as a special case which does not reflect the sum total of dependencies between the two factors and is not supported by an entire mass of empirical data.⁵ Nevertheless, advocates of "supply-side economics" erect a pyramid of evidence upon it. In interpreting this curve they start by stating that in the industrially developed capitalist countries, including the United States, the tax rate at which the absolute amount of tax revenues begins to fall sharply has long been exceeded. On this is based the conclusion that reducing taxes on high incomes will increase the tax revenues in state coffers.

The entire Reagan Administration tax policy since 1981 has been founded on faith in the Laffer Curve. The prognostications presented by the U. S. Treasury Secretary and reproduced in the table below are highly instructive in this regard. Promises of the American administration to balance the budget by 1984 were based on such calculations. It was assumed that tax reductions would make it possible during 1981-1986 to increase annual investments by 11 percent; provide for an average annual increase in labor productivity (per worker) of 2 percent; increase employment in the private sector by 11.8 million; and reduce unemployment to 5.7 percent of the work force.⁶

As is known, the U. S. economy did not even approximate a single one of these parameters, and by 1985 the budget deficit rose to an unprecedented level of approximately \$200 billion.

Table
Influence of the Tax Program on the Dynamic of Federal Budget Revenues
(billions of dollars)

	Fiscal Years					
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Direct effect of income reductions						
a) personal	-6.4	-44.4	-81.4	-118.1	-141.5	-162.4
b) on corporate profits	-2.5	-9.7	-18.6	-30.0	-44.2	-59.3
Total:	-8.8	-53.9	-100.0	-148.1	-185.7	-227.7
Economic effect of tax reductions						
a) on GNP growth (%)	+0.7	+3.2	+5.1	+4.6	+4.2	+4.2
b) on growth in federal budget revenues	+600.3	+650.3	+709.1	+770.7	+849.9	+940.2

Source: "President Reagan's Tax Policy Recommendations". Washington, 1981, 111, p 17.

"Supply-side economics" views the situation of the mass of the population merely as a function of capital development. If the latter comes into play, capital investments rise and the volume of production increases, then a growing part of the population will be involved in the production process and receive direct material gains. These gains should in the end cover losses caused by the harsh economic policy and reductions in social expenditures, subsidies, etc. Those who, for whatever reason, find themselves thrown overboard by the production mechanism must be "written off" as ballast which impedes effectiveness and entrepreneurial initiative. Concern about this ballast must be turned over to private charity.

Before the concept of "supply-side economics" was formulated, "monetarism" played the role of the main conservative economic theory.⁷ Its advocates were divided into various schools, the positions of which somewhat differed one from another: "Chicago" (M. Friedman); "Austrian" ((L. Mizes) and (F. Khayyek)); "Fiscal" (K. Brunner and (A. Mel'tser)); "Global," etc.⁸ These schools had common chief characteristics which made it possible to view them within a framework of a single direction. They all defended the thesis of classical bourgeois political economics about the "internal stability" of the capitalist system, based on "improved competition." According to this the crisis development of the capitalist economy was explained by departure from "improved competition" as a result of governmental interference in economic development; excessive taxes which "destroy" interest in investments and work; reduction in the "natural norm" of unemployment which maintains worker moral; and, last but not least, the absence of necessary control over the amount of money in circulation. In connection with this, limiting the money supply,

eliminating any forms of interference by government institutions in the economic processes, including determining the cost of the labor force; and sharp tax reduction were proposed as the main ways of righting the economy.

In recent years, "supply-side economics" and monetarism have become so closely related that in the specialized literature the latter has more and more often come to be viewed as a specific trend within the former. This is especially characteristic of the United States, where differences between recommendations by the advocates of "supply-side economics" and the monetarists have been reduced to a minimum.

A detailed examination of the degree of applicability of "supply-side economics" and its monetarist variant, as well as their direct consequences for the economy, fall outside the framework of our topic. In this regard it is enough to note that many of the formulas proposed by conservative theoreticians turned out to be simply unrealizable, either because they contradicted objective economic reality, or because they met resolute resistance from the effected social groups. Implementation of these formulas led to contradictory results. On the one hand the economy was seemingly pumped up, and this, naturally, was reflected in its development. On the other hand, all the already existing crisis processes also received additional impetus.

The consequences of conservative economic policy turned out to be especially destructive in the social sphere. Whereas before the mid-1970's social differentiation in the industrially developed capitalist countries was realized chiefly in a concealed form, conservative economic policy gave it an open character. The boundaries between the privileged social groups and those discriminated against became more clear, and the gulf between rich and poor widened. The status of that part of the population with incomes below the official poverty level worsened. Indices of morbidity, death and crime increased accordingly.

The increase in labor supply over demand for it, which was stimulated by conservative economic policy, intensified the tendency toward wage reductions, both direct and indirect. Some of the social gains of past years, about which the working class was justifiably proud, were more or less emasculated.

In other words, implementation of conservative economic policy, even to the limited degree in which it was accomplished, turned in practice into "social revanchism" by the well-off classes for the losses of the first post-war decades.

No less significant was the psychological harm suffered by the working class population. "Modernization" of the economy, implemented with complete disregard for its social consequences, made the problem of employment particularly acute. Turning existence without work into a way of life for a significant part of society resulted in dividing wage workers into two groups: those included and those not included in production. To this was added the division of workers into those employed in sectors having or not having future prospects from the point of view of capital. The involuntary competition

between various groups of workers, which arose based on this, weakened their positions in opposition to capital.

A growing loss of confidence in the future, fear for their jobs and the psychological pressure of their environment began to undermine the militant spirit of employed wage workers, push them into defensive postures and impel them to much greater concessions than dictated by the economic situation, level of public wealth and real correlation of forces. For unemployed workers, material burdens, which were merely eased by the system of social benefits, were aggravated by profound moral shocks, fraught with loss of faith in their strength and self-respect, and weakening and then even complete disappearance of social ties. Such shocks were especially telling on representatives of the younger generations, for whom participation in social production became impossible from the very outset.

Disappointment in bourgeois-liberal and social reformist models of economic development, everywhere associated with the model of the "social state" and "general welfare state," which was able and prepared to ensure a high and steadily improving standard to all of its citizens, led to disorientation of mass population categories. Illusions spread in their midst, based on a belief that the harsh economic policy imposed on capitalist society by conservative forces would open the way to later improvement. This resulted in greater patience than under other conditions on the part of socially injured population groups toward the measures proposed by "supply-side economics" and monetarism.

The interim results of conservative economic policy in those countries where it was most persistently implemented (the U. S. and Great Britain) are presented by its advocates as evidence of, if not total, at least partial success. Despite all the efforts of the ruling class, the electoral victories of advocates of conservatism and a number of major economic projects implemented by them, they did not succeed in eliminating the basic economic and social gains of the workers. The conservative governments lacked sufficient political support to seriously infringe upon the pension system, substantially reduce unemployment allowances, entirely curtail medical support, etc. In those instances when it partially succeeded, the negative consequences turned out for the "haves" to be much worse than the envisioned gain.

Redistribution of the social product through the social security system, which was rather extensively implemented in the industrially developed capitalist countries over the course of the post-war decades, was, you see, in no way a voluntary gift of those in power to their people. Achieved by the working masses in stubborn struggle, it at the same time served as an important social "shock-absorber," softening the outward manifestations of class confrontation, and an instrument of the same social and political "consensus" which the ruling class so sought to achieve. To infringe upon this redistribution means to infringe on the "consensus" itself.

And indeed, as the "social dismantling," accomplished in the process of implementing conservative economic policy was carried out, the "consensus," already highly unstable, began to have ever more noticeable troubles. The

decline of the strike movement and other forms of class struggle, noted in the early 1980's, was replaced starting in 1984 by an increase in open forms of resistance to conservative economic policy. The more significant the efforts aimed at "social dismantling," the stronger they were rebuffed.

Conservative theoreticians to some extent took into account the possibility of such a development. This was the reason for their increased attention to political means of countering the resistance of the masses to "social revanchism." The core of these means is the idea of "narrowing democracy." In various forms it is present in all conservative models, as well as in the political documents based on them.

The energetic appeal of conservatives for "strong government" should be viewed in this way. At first such an appeal may seem strange. After all, conservatives, as a rule, strongly criticize government institutions, accusing them of illegal acquisition of power and bureaucratization. However, under close examination it becomes clear that in reality they are talking about "different" governments. A government is reviled which interferes in the economic sphere, constituting what in the conservative viewpoint is illegal competition with private capital. But even in this case the hostility toward the government is not absolute. In any case the government retains the opportunity to come to the aid of private capital, if it should find itself in a grievous situation. In the political sphere, government activeness does not cause negative emotions. To the contrary. It is expected to create conditions which ensure the uninterrupted functioning of capital. And since for this the government requires strength, conservatives favor such strength without qualification.

The conservatives see as one of the main flaws of the existing capitalist state system the so-called "crisis of governing" which it has given rise to; in other words, its inability to fully realize those economic and social objectives which the conservative advocates of "social revanchism" impose on society. The modern state, claims for example (B. Gugenberger), the West German conservative publicist, goes to extremes to meet the demands of its citizens. But this makes it weak and dependent, "a giant with feet of clay."⁹ Such a government has ceased being "the center of crystallization of the political loyalty of its citizens."¹⁰ At the same time it has lost its function of defending them.

(R. Skraton), one of the conservative theoreticians whose ideas guide Margaret Thatcher, also resorts to such arguments. Reviling in every way the liberal-reformist "welfare state," he contemptuously calls it a "distribution center," which is harmful because it inculcates in people an impression about their "natural right" to housing, health insurance, well-being and comfort, "thereby demoralizing both the will of invalids and its own authority."¹¹ The state, in (Skraton's) opinion, is first of all power, and power cannot be subordinated to any objectives, be they "social justice," "equality" or "freedom." Power exists to command and compel those who otherwise would be engaged in reforms and destruction, and its justification must be sought within itself. He views one of the most important differences between conservatives and liberals to be that "for conservatives the value of

individual freedom is not absolute, but is subordinated to another, higher value -- the authority of legitimate government."¹²

This assessment calls forth specific recommendations which conservative ideologues of various stripes give to the "powers that be." In sum, all these recommendations boil down to the need for particular reliance on the function of direct force as the main way of implementing authority. "If society does not wish to become the victim of individual, changing moods and demands," writes (G. Shesni), the West German conservative political scientist, "it must have constant control, and constant intervention of state departments that possess authority, which enables it, guided by the capabilities and needs of society, to oppose that which one or another group of interests, which has been able to energize a majority of the population, is attempting to achieve."¹³

(G. K. Kal'tenbruner), prominent conservative ideologue in the FRG, expresses the same thought, although in different words. "The need has arisen for a rebirth of political strength, in the true meaning of the word, namely of the state, to balance competing societal interests and ever more dangerous technological development, which is influencing even man's genetic essence." This state "can not be satisfied with simply being an executive organ of competing social forces, and cannot rely on the hope that the necessary prerequisites and conditions for individual freedom and ecological balance will occur by themselves, as the result of the influence of competing groups."¹⁴

Conservatives see the route to strengthening the coercive function of the state to be, first of all, the gradual dismantling of democratic institutions. In its most concentrated form, this orientation is embodied in the theory of "democratic rule of the elites," representing in reality a defense of anti-democratic, elitist absolute power. According to this theory, the highest groups of the ruling class represent not only the most effective and creative force in society but, moreover, the foundation for its existence. "The masses, and not the elites, are becoming a potential danger to the system, and the elites, and not the masses, are its defender," writes (P. Barakh), one of the active advocates of this theory in the FRG.¹⁵

The essence of the theory of the "democratic rule of the elites" can be reduced to several basic postulates. The first is based on the assertion that under present-day conditions, characterized by substantially more complicated problems facing society, the role of elite groups which are competent in the affairs of governing is not only not declining by comparison with the past, but is significantly increasing. (Kh. Shel'ski), a West German sociologist close to the CDU [Christian Democratic Union], in demonstrating this thesis, refers first to the imperatives of the technological revolution. Responsibility and control over the development of industry and technology, he writes, must be in the hands of a technological elite, which makes decisions strictly on the basis of "business imperatives," which it itself defines. Democracy is no longer needed, since modern technology "does not require legitimization." "The technological state, being antidemocratic, deprives democracy of its essence."¹⁶

The second postulate stems from the belief that the "common man," by nature is not fit to influence the process of governing society. "The high level of civilization of individuals, increased professional qualification and intellectualization of the masses do not prevent the breakdown of atavistic systems," asserts (K. Kene), West German conservative political scientist, condemning "universal suffrage, under which the vote of a university professor, economic leader or professional politician is valued no more than that of a person who completed secondary school, or a criminal not yet deprived of his "civil rights." And further: "The masses never implement power. At the most they apply force. The masses are not a motor, but are in the best case a wheel."¹⁷

A negative attitude toward the people as bearers of power unavoidably entails a reexamination of such a seemingly "organic" postulate of classic bourgeois democratic theory as equality (the third basic postulate of the "democratic rule of the elites").

Of course, not all conservative ideologues agree with the approach to the problems of democracy characteristic of the advocates of the theory of "democratic rule of the elites." However, existing differences do not prevent them from unanimity when discussing the essence of the matter. All agree that the current number of democratic rights of the people in the developed capitalist countries is "too great." They all strive to reduce popular participation in the political process to a one-time electoral act. They decisively reject and proclaim destructive any proposals aimed at broadening that participation by the use of elements of direct democracy. It is proposed that the main efforts be aimed at making the gap between the "electoral masses" and representative institutions as great as possible.

A strategy of "de-politicizing political relations" is recommended as one of the most effective means of achieving this objective. Its essence is that a problem requiring a political decision is reduced to the level of choosing one of two purveyors of political goods, the differences between whom are of secondary importance. Correspondingly, the political system is likened to the free market, at which the purveyors of political goods, resorting to commercial advertisement, foist them upon the consumer, and the winner is he who is able to do so most deftly. In this case reliance is placed on the belief that the use of such a mechanism will in the end lead to the alienation of the masses from the political process, which is taken in this variant as alien to the interests of the common man, and as a hopeless and dirty business. And in fact, in the U. S., where such a model has long been used and in its most open form, the level of political involvement and political activity of the citizens (even in its most primary, electoral form) is the lowest in the capitalist world.

As such a strategy is extended to other industrially developed capitalist countries, their citizens' interest in the electoral process also declines, a fact which is favorably assessed by conservative ideologues.

Recently, certain tendencies in present-day state monopoly development, which from their viewpoint are opening up additional possibilities for limiting the

political influence of the lower social strata, are attracting the attention of the advocates of dismantling democratic structures.

It is well known that the sharp increase in the amount of governmental interference in the social, economic and other non-political spheres of public life gave rise to an objective need to expand substantially -- beyond the bounds of the traditional political system -- the legitimate channels of interaction between civil society and the state. As a result, back in the stage of "early" state monopoly capitalism, in parallel with representative institutions and along with them, there began to arise a fundamentally different system of relations between the governed and governing, based not on territorial, but on functional representation. It was not the parties, which unite their members on the principle of common political views and objectives, but non-party organization, which group people either on the basis of like social function performed, or adherence to one or another specific interest, which served as the representatives of "public interests."

As these institutions developed, an entire system of functional representation arose, consisting of institutions differing in caliber, status and the duties placed on them. It was namely this system which also became the place of "meeting" between representatives of interested groups and state authorities.

A most important difference between functional representation and the traditional political party system is that, while in the latter elected institutions are manned entirely or primarily by representatives of the political parties, and the winning party forms the government and other organs of executive power, the institutions of functional representation, in contrast, are created and formed from above, essentially by direction. The state not only establishes their composition and powers, formulates their tasks and finances these institutions, but also, as a rule, sends its representatives to them. It determines the "rules of the game," in accordance with which the activity of the given institutions occurs, and can at any moment interrupt the work of any of them, create new ones, etc.¹⁸⁻²⁰

It is apparent that the special features of the functional system create favorable opportunities for it to turn into an influential factor, opposing the representative system and impacting on it in an anti-democratic spirit.

The emergence, development and strengthening of the functional system of government gave rise to a stream of literature in defense, published under the banner of neo-corporativism. Not all advocates of neo-corporativism can be characterized as conservatives. Among them is an influential liberal wing, which views the functional system not as a counterweight, but as a supplement to parliamentary representative institutions. Nevertheless, the predominantly conservative nature of neo-corporative theories is indubitable. Conservative theoreticians from the very outset saw in neo-corporative tendencies an additional real opportunity to weaken democratic influence on state structures, realized through parliamentary institutions. Historical links between conservatism and corporativism played an important role. It is enough to recall that a neo-conservative, (A. Meller van den Bruk), a forerunner of the German National Socialists, was one of the first people in pre-war Europe to express the thought about the preferability of referring to capitalist

society as a form of political government based on the functional principle.²¹ One of the authors of corporativism, which arose in those years, was (O. Shpamm), a right-wing conservative Austrian philosopher, creator of the model of a class-corporate "organic state."²² This model was tested in practice by the fascists and spiritually related right conservative regimes.

The tragic experience of fascism for the peoples discredited the corporativist model. It is obvious, however, that close spiritual ties between conservatism and corporativism were retained. And this influenced the attitude of conservatives toward neo-corporativism.

To correctly assess the social content of an ideological system, it is extremely important to know against whom its blows are mostly directed. Analysis of conservative literature leaves no doubts in this regard. The main enemy of neo-conservatives is communism, by which is meant the countries of real socialism, the communist parties in the industrially developed capitalist states and other social and political forces which are resisting the policy of "social revanchism." Attacks against social reformism and liberalism result either from the fact that they, in the profound conviction of conservatives, display an unjustified pliability with respect to communism, or by the fact that in the competition for the favor of the ruling class, these forces play the role of competitors to conservatism.

Highly instructive from the viewpoint of the social content of conservatism is its attitude toward trade unions. In the years of the capitalism of "free competition," the main persecutors of the trade unions were considered to be the right liberals of the Manchester inclination. Now the conservatives have greatly passed by their liberal competitors in this respect. Trade unions are declared to be the deadly enemy of the modern capitalist state. It is namely on them that the main responsibility is placed for all economic and social difficulties being experienced by capitalist society. Appeasement, weakening and, if possible, elimination of trade unions is proclaimed as one of the main objectives of practical conservative politics.

Recently, new democratic movements, including alternative movements, have become the object of most fierce attacks by conservatives. This is not prevented by the fact that on some issues (protecting the environment, limiting technical progress) the views of conservatives and some advocates of alternative movements seemingly intersect. To the contrary, this intersection brings particular ferocity to the conservative attacks on the alternative movements. For conservatives, the "Green Alternative Movement" is a movement of leftists, who usurped the ecology issue opened by the neo-conservatives."²³ Therefore, such movements are viewed as enemies "squared:" both as leftists, and as competitors, venturing to hunt on the conservative reservation.

In the matter of dismantling democratic structures, the conservatives who have made their way into power have thus far been less successful than they have in implementing economic policy. The population's rejection of their aims in this area has turned out to be greater than first expected. Nevertheless, politicians guided by neo-conservative aspirations have succeeded here as well in partially implementing their plans. In a number of countries, legislation providing sanctions for "violating public order" has been made more severe.

Police powers have been extended. Limitations on their application of extreme force have been reduced. Serious blows have been inflicted on the trade union movement. Discrimination against persons participating in the struggle against the policy of "social revanchism" and dismantling democratic institutions is being ever more widely practiced.

The danger of tendencies of this sort is defined not only by their direct significance, but also by the fact that they create conditions for a further attack on the democratic rights of the population, and for authoritarian restructuring of public institutions, about which the defenders of neo-conservatism speak incompletely, and frequently even maintain silence.

Needless to say, the extent to which such plans are implemented will depend on the real arrangement of political forces in the region of developed capitalism, and most of all on how effective the opposition to conservatism will be, both in the ideological and the practical political areas.

FOOTNOTES

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CSO: 1807/0336

BOVIN, LUKIN DISCUSS 'CENTERS OF POWER' THEORIES

Moscow, RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYI MIR in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 85 pp 80-89

[Discussion between A. Ye. Bobin, IZVESTIYA correspondent, and Professor V. P. Lukin, doctor of historical sciences: "'Centers of Power' -- Doctrine and Reality"]

[Text] We are living in a time when facts of an internal nature are most closely interrelated with international factors and are interconnected with them. Events on the world arena, the nature and relationship of conflicting forces, have a significant impact on the domestic life of each state, on the position of the working class and the workers, and on the course and outcome of their struggle against the exploitation of man by man.

The study of the modern system of international relations and its developmental tendencies is one of the important tasks of social science. In this connection, analysis of the concept of "centers of power," which has recently been seen more and more often in foreign policy literature and journalism, both in our country and abroad, is of interest. It conceals a clash of various approaches to the most important problems of world policy. A. Ye. Bobin, IZVESTIYA political correspondent, and Professor V. P. Lukin, doctor of historical sciences, engage in a dialogue on these issues.

Bobin: Let us begin at the end. The latest achievement of bourgeois thought on the question in which we are interested is the widely known Reagan Concept, which is based on the belief that two main forces operate in the modern world: "absolute good" (themselves, naturally) and "absolute evil" (that is, us). Like in the good old days, there are only "ourselves" and "strangers." Between them is a dividing line which separates "good" from "evil," and "virtue" from "sin."

Lukin: It seems that the U. S. President has now begun to avoid such terminology.

Bobin: This is true. His speeches are using a different tone. But I am afraid that he thinks as before. And I completely understand his persistent

desire for a "bi-polar" diagram. A healthy class instinct is at work. After all, on the social plane the world around us, no matter how many "centers of power" are at work in it, is truly a bi-polar world. Two main forces -- socialism and capitalism -- interact, i.e., compete and cooperate. And the American political metaphysics of an absolute confrontation between "good" and "evil" reflects precisely this fact, in a distorted and primitive form.

However, the processes at work on the political level are not a mirror image of social dualism. Political relations are not limited to the conflict between capitalism and socialism, but are more complex and contradictory and filled with undertones and nuances. Social antagonism, especially in the nuclear age, in no way excludes the possibility of many-sided cooperation between West and East.

Lukin: Exactly. And therefore the most important thing is to oppose political over-simplification with political realism and conceptual primitivism with our understanding of the world's complexity and multi-level nature.

Bobin: Well, the existence of "centers of power" and the tendency for them to expand is the most real reality there is in the present-day system of international relations and one aspect of their multi-level nature. However, "centers of power," per se, is far from a new concept. Great powers have always existed and, whether Carthage or Rome, they were also "centers of power." People began to speak long before they thought up this term.

Lukin: All the same, it seems to me that there is a difference between the concepts, "great powers" and "centers of power." One journalist once said about detente: "If detente were analogous to peace, it would have been called peace." Unfortunately, he turned out to be right. So, if "centers of power" were the same as "great powers" they would have been so named.

Bobin: And if, just the same, they are essentially equivalent?

Lukin: In essence I wanted to say that absolute synonyms do not exist. What shade of meaning does the concept "centers of power" have? First of all, it is a modern phenomenon with a collection of components of power (including non-military) which is unique to our time. Further, in my opinion, great powers are only potential "centers of power." They become true "centers of power" only if they carry out a certain type of foreign policy, specifically an activist-nationalist type.

Bobin: Given this approach the Soviet Union is not a "center of power." Do I understand you correctly?

Lukin: That is logical. The major socialist states are great powers, but not "centers of power." That is, at least, their natural, normal condition. Only in those cases (and such instances are well known to our readers) when a major socialist state, against internationalist principles and for reasons the analysis of which is outside the framework of our discussion, begins to incline toward an activist-nationalist, hegemonist foreign policy can it be considered to have a "center of power" orientation.

Bobin: To me this formulation is unconvincing. It seems to me that it is based not on scientific considerations, but on a naive, moralizing view that "power" is in principle something bad and reprehensible. However, power in and of itself is outside of morality. One can speak about something being good and something being bad only when we are dealing with the use of power -- for the sake of what, and in the name of what objectives it is used.

The Soviet Union is not a potential, but an entirely real "center of power" (in the complete range of its elements). And the other "centers of power" know this perfectly well. Otherwise they would talk to us in an entirely different language. Otherwise we would not be able to play the role in world politics which we play. It goes without saying that here the question concerns the social and class nature of various "powers," and about the specific policy for which they stand, but this is a different question. And it is clear enough.

Lukin: I would say that our disagreement is over terminology. It is a complex problem -- force, its use, right and morality -- and an exceptionally important and pressing one. Especially for our time. For example, "centers of power," it seems to me, by definition have a tendency to exploit to the maximum the opportunities which their power gives them, giving little consideration to the interests and aspirations of others (both enemies and partners). "Demand the impossible -- get the maximum" -- this Napoleonic slogan is the unwritten law of "center of power" policy. But what does this mean for the nuclear age? Has it not come to pass in our day that power used "to the limit" is, under some circumstances, automatically becoming immoral?

Bobin: Why must it be "to the limit?" Any, even minimal use of power to achieve objectives contrary to the modern democratic sense of law and order will be, as you say, "automatically" immoral. A crying example is the actions of the Americans in Grenada.

Lukin: Excuse me, I did not finish my thought.

It is true that power has been the "midwife of history" throughout all human existence. But the situation is beginning to change in an environment in which uncurtailed and "natural" use of available force more and more definitively means the end of history. Traditional "center of power" conduct at the local level leads to calamities and unhappiness of a local nature (as is taking place now in the course of the Iran-Iraq conflict). After this conflict something will remain, there will be another history, although, of course, this will be small consolation to the thousands and thousands killed. But what about a conflict which could be caused by a traditional attitude toward force in more powerful centers? Is not our rejection of first-use of our nuclear power related, in particular, to this?

So, in my opinion, one of the characteristic traits of "centers of power" is the tendency to take a traditional view toward the use of power in a non-traditional situation.

Bobin: It seems to me that you are equating any case of "traditional" use of power with a center of power policy. But in this case the concept of a "center of power" itself becomes very vague.

Nevertheless, a dispute over terminology somehow is not appealing. Remember when N. Biner, the "father of cybernetics," was asked: "Can a machine think?" He answered, "It all depends on definitions." Let us talk about substance. Since your book on "centers of power" came out not so long ago, you, as they say, have the cards in your hands.

Lukin: In the opinion of many specialists who are studying world policy more seriously than the ideologues in Reagan's circle, the post-war world has already turned or is turning (here opinions differ) from bi-polar to multi-polar. They write that the two old poles of foreign policy attraction (the USSR and U. S.) are being joined by three more: the 10 EEC [European Economic Community] countries, Japan and the PRC. To this list are frequently added so-called regional centers of power: mainly the largest states of Asia (India, Indonesia), Africa (Nigeria, Egypt) and Latin America (Brazil, Mexico and Argentina) as well as such specific states as the Republic of South Africa and Israel.

Bobin: The picture is extremely diverse.

Lukin: Without a doubt. Especially on the social plane. You see, in the clearly incomplete listing given above we see states which are capitalist and socialist, developed and developing, large and small; in short, differing most widely one from another.

Bobin: In our context, with all the emphasis on differences it is important also to disclose something they hold in common. All of these poles, or "centers of power," play an active role in international relations. V. I. Lenin wrote that "...each state lives in a system of states, which are in a system of known political balance relative to one another" ("Complete Works", Vol 42, p 59). Thus, this balance, both on the global and regional levels, is based first of all on balanced relations among "centers of power." Obviously, the more the number of poles the more difficult it is to maintain the system in a balanced state. Therefore, the multi-polar world appreciably complicates the work of diplomats. In general, the balance is a known balance of powers. This formula also entirely includes the "balance of terror," under which we have already been living for many years. It is not the best variant, of course. But it has turned out to be rather stable.

Lukin: Today it is sometimes said that political multi-polarity coexists with strategic military bi-polarity.

Bobin: This is so. The Soviet Union and the United States of America possess unique strategic military capabilities, exceeding many times over those which the other members of the "nuclear club" possess. It is no accident, therefore, that in SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] it was possible to omit the capabilities of third states when compiling a global strategic balance. However, if the tendency is kept in mind, it works against the

indicated bi-polarity. It is enough to recall the sharp polemics surrounding French and British nuclear capabilities.

Lukin: After accomplishing approved modernization projects, the British and French will have more than 1,500 nuclear warheads.

Bobin: This is power. I have no doubt that in the not so distant future it will also be necessary to consider most seriously the Chinese capability. In general bi-polarity is eroding. Let us hope that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will limit the nuclear polygon to its currently existing five sides. Although I can say in advance that this will not be easy.

But let us return to the heart of our topic. It is possible, it goes without saying, to balance terror. But just the same, for all those who are striving for a stable, peaceful, multi-polar world, the task, if we speak about the future, is to shift from a "balance of terror" and a balance of power to a balance of interests. This approach is possible only in an environment of detente and at least the first steps toward real arms reductions.

In the West these problems (excluding detente and disarmament) are followed persistently by the school of "political realism." Judging by your book, you have no great grievances against the representatives of this school.

Lukin: Well, why should I? This doctrine encompasses and reflects essential aspects of actual foreign policy reality, otherwise it could not have become so widespread and hardy. Many consider its founders to have been Hobbs and Machiavelli, the American "Founding Fathers," and Metternich. There truly do exist large, medium and small states in the world, and relations among them are not limited to social imperatives. They are also stipulated by historical, geopolitical and socio-political motives. There also exist the problems of equilibrium, balance of forces, etc.

At the same time, the doctrine of "political realism" is on the whole a one-sided doctrine. Its advocates clearly underestimate at least two important circumstances. First are the fundamental social realities underlying the dynamic of diverse international ties. Second is the level of indirect relationships and interrelations in the world and the growing importance of global problems, which limit the freedom of maneuver of various claimants to the status of "centers of power."

Bobin: As a rule, in the history of science one one-sided phenomenon gives rise to another, outwardly contradicting the first. In our case the theoreticians (and practitioners) who give stress to interdependence are the antagonists of the political realists.

Lukin: Yes, we can speak about the already formed doctrine of interdependence. Its leading representatives, such people as, for example, Brzezinski, reject what is in their opinion an antiquated, narrow nationalistic interpretation of international relations as games of autonomous "national interests." They promote a version of world order based on the idea of gradually overcoming the economic and political separation of the main imperialist centers. They dream about creating a single super-center in the

future, based on the integration of the social-economic and political structures of the main capitalist "centers of power". They represent this process as stemming directly from the imperatives of technological interpenetration. Underscoring their technological optimism," they believe that it can overcome inter-imperialist competition at the state level.

Bobin: The ideas of advocates of interdependence are being developed actively within the framework of the "trilateral commission," which unites on a non-governmental level, representatives of Western Europe, Japan and the U. S. Given many qualifications, the annual meetings of "the seven" -- the leaders of the seven leading capitalist powers -- can also be seen in this context. For me the tendency is obvious: ways and methods are being sought to coordinate the economic and political strategy of the main centers of imperialism. The social meaning of what is taking place is also clear. These are attempts to strengthen the positions of imperialism and the monopoly bourgeoisie in the struggle against socialism and the workers' movement. In general, returning to the theory, whereas the political realists absolutize the centrifugal processes of present-day capitalism and try to turn them into a model for international relations overall, the advocates of mutual dependence absolutize the centripetal, levelling processes. As best I recall, the existence of and competition between these differing concepts is related to the fact that within the ruling elites of the capitalist world clash various groups and factions, each with its own interests.

Lukin: This relationship does exist. We know that in each major capitalist state a constant struggle goes on among various ruling class groupings for one or another form of foreign policy orientation. Wider public circles are also involved in this struggle. One group stresses overall capitalist coordination. Another stresses more one-sided, nationalistic and "egoistic" actions with respect to its partners, appealing to "traditions of national greatness." We recall, for example, the discussion between Atlanticism and Gaullism (not only French) in Western Europe. It is extremely acute now as well.

Bobin: There is also another topic for discussion. For official Washington, the "Trilateral Commission" -- a kind of headquarters for advocates of mutual dependence -- has become almost an anti-American organization. Why does America depend on anyone? Let everyone depend on her.

Lukin: Even in Washington people learn. "Later" Reaganism considers its allies more often, their views and fears, than did its earlier, fiercely ideolized, openly "center of power" variant.

Bobin: You are right. Extremes are rarely maintained in politics. Even "early" Reagan had to accept the rules of the game which were set by the "seven." Just the same, it is difficult to give subtleties and nuances to Americans. Their obsession with the "greatness" of America unavoidably leads to replacing too "complex" and too "scholarly" concepts with a collection of primitive slogans. Reliance on the "greatness" of one's own nation and state is always one of the psychological prerequisites of specific "center of power" thinking.

Lukin: In this connection, let me make some remarks on the subject of our conversation as it applies to the developing countries. Here, in my opinion, the processes of turning "primary nationalism," in which ethnic, tribal, racial and religious motives predominated, into another level of nationalism, I would call it "state nationalism," have strengthened in recent decades. In terms of its social content, it represents mainly the ideology of the privileged, leading strata, grouped around the state apparatus.

Bobin: Recently I came across the term, "thieves' capitalism," as applied to one of the Asiatic countries, which I will not name.

Lukin: Precisely. Those and only those flourish who, either openly (occupying a corresponding post), or secretly (getting involved in the far-flung network of favoritism) are linked into the system of political power.

Bobin: This is the basis for the main accusation against the authorities -- corruption. We recall one of the most recent examples -- the coup in Nigeria.

Lukin: A main ideological impulse of such groups is reliance on the priority of "specific national character," as contrasted to the more profound social realities of the country and the world as a whole. This intensifies "nation-state" ambition, an aspiration to satisfy as soon as possible, not especially taking into account available means, the requirements of its prestige as a power, at the cost of neglecting the urgent interests of the majority of its population and often at the expense of other developing countries.

I think that the desire of the ruling groupings of some major developing countries to compensate for their past and present dependence on imperialism by rapid acquisition of the outward attributes of regional self-assertion represents an important factor in the appearance of pretenders to the role of "centers of power."

Bobin: And since in the "third world" there are no limitations associated with the "balance of terror," such pretensions can take on the form of bloody clashes. A vivid example is the war between Iran and Iraq. It has been going on already for more than four years. Hundreds of thousands of people have perished. In the name of what? In the name of Allah they say in Teheran. I read somewhere that before battle Iranian soldiers are issued plastic keys. If they are killed these will open the gates of heaven. It is a senseless, criminal war of ambitions.

Lukin: It is senseless, of course. But it is not paradoxical. Pay attention to the fact that the Shiites in Iraq are fighting stubbornly -- contrary to the expectations of the mullahs in Teheran -- against the Iranian Shiites. Here is modern nationalism -- state nationalism. If we try to "break down" analytically any major regional conflict of our time, we will uncover in some combination or another the influence of three factors on its origins and course: purely internal causes (I have in mind intra-country, socio-political, ethnic and new factors); the global factor (imperialism and its opposition to socialism); and, finally, the factor of competition between regional centers of power. The latter is especially vivid in this case. But it is also very noticeable in many other crises and conflicts in the countries

of the "developing zone." However, from the heated problems of the "hot belt" we should return to the somewhat more moderate global level. On this level, analysis most often relies on simple geometric analogies: "triangles," "quadrilaterals," "pentagonals."

Bobin: On the global plane the "pentagonal diagram," involving the USSR, U. S., PRC, Japan and Western Europe, is most widespread. It is true that regardless of what one thinks about the diagram, one corner clearly sticks out. You see, Western Europe, although "integrated," must be put in "quotes."

Lukin: In recent years there was a predominance of statements in both our press and the foreign press, about the difficulties and contradictions on the path to Western European integration. Under conditions of prolonged economic crisis in the capitalist world, when each was saving himself, sharp contradictions were revealed within the EEC, which in the eyes of many placed in question the fate of this association.

However, if we view this question in the broader historical perspective, the problem of a European "center of power" appears somewhat different. The measures taken since the time of the conclusion of the Rome Treaty in the area of economic integration are obvious and, apparently, irreversible. Organs of political coordination among the "ten" were created and are in operation (although with limited effectiveness). The first foreign policy documents of a West European-wide scale have been adopted (relating to the developing countries, the Middle East and Latin America). Finally, different variants of military integration are being worked out. I think that namely this integrating policy will also in the future force its way through the numerous difficulties and obstacles.

Bobin: It will probably be so. They will argue and fuss. But no one plans to leave. To the contrary, new applicants are knocking louder and louder on the doors of the EEC. I suspect that the "best friends" of Western Europe -- the Americans -- are not overjoyed at this prospect.

U. S. policy is simple: Although you are a "pole," you must obey your seniors. And the Americans apply pressure on Western Europe and Japan. Thus far, despite some cracks it is succeeding. They are keeping their problems "in the family," so to speak. I believe that by the end of the 20th Century much will change.

The prominent American historian, (A. Burstein) said once: "In looking at the world we Americans look in a mirror, rather than out a window." Nostalgic illusions, yearning for the past "greatness" of America, an attempt to return to yesterday, all this is a reaction to the weakened positions of the U. S. in the world. The U. S., it goes without saying, remains a great power. But it is no longer unique and incomparable, and will never be so again. It is one of the major "centers of power." No more than that.

Lukin: It is true that now many are talking about the U. S. again moving forward, squeezing its main partner-competitors, especially Western Europe. In any case, the U. S. crawled out of the last economic crisis, by all appearances, more quickly and with higher spirits than the others. Reagan

actively -- and not without results, as we know -- exploited this situation during the 1984 election campaign.

Bobin: Yes, things are a bit better in the U. S. than on the other side of the Atlantic. And this is to no small extent because the Americans, maintaining high interest rates, are pumping over to themselves the money of their partners and allies.

Lukin: There is an important social aspect here too, which is closely linked with "center of power" competition. The current American administration calculates that trying to solve its own crisis problems at the expense of Western Europe will reestablish and extend class peace and social stability in the country.

Bobin: This social aspect also has a reverse side. By pumping into American banks those funds which Western Europe usually expends on "placatory" social programs, Washington is helping to increase social tension in Western Europe. The European neo-conservatives are so far not frightened by this. They themselves are striving to dismantle the social gains of the workers, counting on enlivening the economy in this way and taking some points in the commercial competition with the U. S. There may be some temporary successes on this path. But in principle, considering the strength of the workers organizations, it leads into a blind alley of unsolved contradictions.

In general the U. S. is thus far in the lead. But it is more and more difficult for her to retain her leadership. No matter how drastic it is, it will be necessary to "cut the clothing according to the cloth." It is difficult to teach this science to the American ruling class. Instead of adapting American policy to a changing world where America is merely "one of" the powers, the Americans again and again try to adapt the world to U. S. interests and policy.

Lukin: In recent decades the Nixon-Kissinger Administration was distinguished by the most clearly expressed searches for a "center of power" approach. I have in mind the "Nixon Doctrine," with its accent on a "five-polar" world, and its attempt to distance foreign policy somewhat from ideology and view the world as a system of states (first of all the major states), having complex and changing interests, and not as two contrasting groupings of eternal friends and enemies.

Now, as we already said, another tendency is dominant. But, just the same, elements of a more complex approach to reality sometimes open the way and generate discussions in American ruling circles. Recall the Falklands crisis. In this case Washington was unable to determine who were her ideological friends and who her enemies. The ambitions and interests of two "junior" centers of power allied to the U. S. really clashed. In other words, it was in no way Reagan's kind of game. Try as he might, "Communist intrigues" could not be found. This also led to sharp fluctuations between neutralism and support of the stronger and more valuable partner.

Bobin: The "simple American boys," struggling to preserve dominant positions in the White House are clearly not up to the complexities of today's world.

This is clear now even to those in America who in other respects are extremely close to those in power today. Not long ago the latest book of former President Nixon was published.

Lukin: Who, as we know, is a conservative Republican and thus by general political credo close to the Reaganites.

Bobin: Precisely. Thus, in this highly curious book, which is named: "The Real World: A Strategy for the West," he actually contrasts his political convictions and practical experience to military primitivism. Clearly referring to the President, Nixon warns about the danger of confusing two concepts: the real world and a perfect world. We will achieve a perfect world -- believes this pragmatist, experienced in political intrigues -- only in two places: in the grave and on the typewriter, and therefore this word has no practical meaning in a world in which conflicts among various forces are so intractable and ineradicable. He calls for American authorities, in particular present and future presidents, to strive not for a "perfect" world, according to their concepts, but for a "real world;" i.e., for a world in which real forces, interests and aspirations operate and will operate. He calls for combining force with detente and states directly that an American president will achieve nothing with the aid of vainglory and bellicosity.

Of course, Nixon's formulas about a "real" and a "perfect" world are far from true realism, and even less so perfection. But just the same through them can be seen true reality and an understanding of the fact that it is necessary to adapt policy to these realities. Through Nixon's words the cynical-pragmatic part of the American ruling class contrasts itself to the screaming, adventuristic part.

Lukin: And this part of the American ruling class realizes that the world is complex, contradictory and, as its strategists say, "multipolar."

Bobin: In his interview with U. S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Nixon continues to defend his policy of the U. S. - USSR - PRC triangle. He says in part: "The United States along with its desire to improve relations with China, must try to normalize relations with the Soviet Union. The so-called triangular policy can work only if we try to establish good relations with both partners." In connection with this, the former American president believes that "the widely advertised policy of strategic cooperation with China against the Soviet Union is a mistake."

Lukin: We have left aside such an important corner of the polygon as Japan. Everyone knows that in 20 years Japan has been able to become the second greatest economic power in the capitalist world, that she produces more steel and automobiles than the U.S., and that 70 percent of the industrial robots developed outside of the socialist states are Japanese. But this is only one aspect of the matter. The other is that inside, as well as outside of Japan there are forces which would like to turn this country into yet another major military power, in other words, into a traditional "center of power," with the dominant sphere of influence in the Asiatic-Pacific Ocean region.

I am sure that such a choice conceals a danger both for Japan herself and for the overall international situation. It is dangerous for Japan because it would mean switching attention away from those forms and directions of national development which it followed to achieve such impressive results in the post-war period. For the international situation it is because a sharp increase in Japanese military power would only sharply intensify the overall arms race and, consequently, increase the military threat.

Nevertheless, those who push Japan to the path of military preparations are striving most of all to weaken Japanese competitiveness on the world markets.

Bobin: And the Japanese, in my view, are playing a double game. When Nakasone was not Prime Minister he maintained openly nationalistic and, in particular, anti-American views. Now he is the best friend of the U. S. He seems to obey the Americans, is pumping up Japanese military muscles with their blessing and is leasing them Japan's "unsinkable aircraft carrier." But there is an area where Nakasone stands like a rock, and it is economics. Here the Americans can get practically nothing but smiles. It is not impossible that Washington will be no better off than at the start. Not tomorrow, of course, but it is something to consider.

As for Tokyo's military ambitions, the following should be noted: The true and long-term security of Japan can be guaranteed only by steady and stable relations with its closest neighbors.

Lukin: Overall it can be said that the phenomenon which you and I are trying to examine is one of the important (although not the only) symptoms of the fact that our world is becoming ever more multi-rhythmic, I would say, polyphonic. The phenomenon of "centers of power" cannot, of course, be absolutized and a modern concept of international relations be based exclusively on it. However, this concept would not be complete without it either. Without this facet and this reality the general picture of contemporary world politics would be deprived of several essential nuances, and, therefore, would be inadequate.

Bobin: I feel, Vladimir Petrovich, that you have already begun to conclude our talk. I will hasten to add one more observation. The main capitalist "centers of power" (U. S. Western Europe, Japan) belong to the developed world. The countries which are becoming centers of power (Brazil, India, Indonesia) are in the developing world. In the future this will mean the gradual moving up of the "South" to the level of the "North" in the sense of economic development and political influence. However, against this level background differences and conflicts may become worse, the nature and consequences of which we cannot yet imagine. But it does no harm to think about this possibility.

Lukin: Look at Brazil, the country you mentioned first. On the one hand, she is completely financially dependent on the imperialist "centers of power." This gigantic country has a gigantic debt -- on the order of \$100 billion. But there is another side. Brazil is competing successfully with her creditors on the world markets in an ever widening circle of goods, and highly modern ones. Her policy, both foreign and domestic, is ever more autonomous

and ever less controlled from the imperialist "centers of power. And Brazil is not an exception.

However, the main pages of this book will be written past the end of the 20th Century.

Returning to our time, I would like to emphasize that what seem at first glance to be purely theoretical reflections about "centers of power" have, of course, very concrete and practical meaning. Thus, from them derives the need for modern diplomacy to consider many factors simultaneously in making decisions; so to speak, "diplomatic many-sided vision" to a degree never seen before our time. Take, for example, the problem of considering the complex and many-sided balance of interests in, for example, such matters as measures to limit the arms race, problems of nuclear non-proliferation and questions related to deliveries of arms by certain countries to another. Today's problems "show through" everywhere.

Bobin: Just the same, the day of classic "power factors" and, correspondingly, of what you call the "center of power" approach to world politics is passing. Our diplomacy long ago formulated and is defending the principle of collective security. This principle takes into account the realities of a complex world, in which many "actors" are playing. But it also considers something else -- the indivisibility of our world and its close and ever closer interdependence.

Lukin: And this presupposes the unreality of attempts to ensure one's own "absolute security" at the expense of others, ignoring their interests. In our day attempting to build one's strategy on the principles of having as much as everyone else together, and a little bit more, is not only unattainable in practice, but is also counterproductive. It leads to overexerting one's forces and then to losing positions to competitors who have been able to distribute their resources more wisely, and with a more sober calculation of modern reality. Look: Japan spends substantially less on defense than the U. S. But over recent decades has the correlation of forces between these countries changed proportionately to Washington's advantage? Entirely the opposite has occurred! Judging by the heated debate underway in the American Congress over the Fiscal Year 1986 Budget, even inveterate reactionaries -- the conservatives -- are beginning to understand that strengthening the country's positions in the world and increasing military expenditures are far from one and the same thing.

Bobin: The struggle for democratization of the entire system of international relations, for establishment of true equality in international life and for universal and total disarmament is, in essence, a struggle for a multi-polar, multi-rhythmic, but in no way a "center of power" based world. Today, when we are experiencing a crisis of detente, such a peace seems almost utopian. But, tomorrow must come. And the day after. And this raises the hope...

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CSO: 1807/0336

FRENCH SOCIALISTS' RIGHTWARD TURN SINCE 1982 VIEWED

Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYI MIR in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 85 pp 101-116

[Article by I. M. Bunin: "The Socio-Political Struggle in France Today"]

[Text] A number of major reforms took place during the first year of the left majority government: It expanded the nationalized sector, decentralized the system of state administration, gave new rights to the workers, levied a tax on large properties, etc.¹ The Communists emphasized: "A great deal has been done since 1981. Social and economic transformations were accomplished which were unthinkable under rule by the right. Decisions were made about major reforms, which are an important means of struggle with our difficulties."²

In June 1982 the second phase of the French government's policy actually began. Under pressure from international capital, in mid-June 1982 the country undertook the second devaluation of the Franc and decreased its parity with the German Mark by 8.8 percent. This devaluation was accompanied by a number of specialized measures: establishment of control over the growth of prices, and freezing prices, wages, commercial profits and dividends until 31 October 1982. These measures signified switching priority in governmental policy from combatting unemployment to struggling against inflation and improving the competitiveness of the country's industry by reducing industrial costs. Whereas the main features of the "first stage" of activity of the leftist government, in the words of P. Mauroy, former French prime minister, were "economic growth, reforms and a policy of social justice," the government's goal in the "second stage" was proclaimed to be "normalizing" the economy: reducing inflation rates to 5 percent by 1985, stabilizing unemployment (at a level of 2 million people) and balancing trade.

Aligning itself in its economic strategy with the leading capitalist countries, the French government began to carry out a policy of "restraining" wages. To eliminate the deficit in the social security system, it decided to carry out severe economic measures (new indirect taxes, increasing several social insurance payments and the cost of a hospital stay, etc.). The 1983 state budget was aimed at a moderate VVP [domestic gross output] growth rate (2 percent total), reduced government expenditures and lower inflation rates.

In March 1983 a still greater retreat from the left's previously stated economic policy took place. The "Delors Plan," named after the then Minister

of Economy, Finance and Budget, appeared on the heels of the third devaluation of the Franc in two years. This plan envisioned increasing direct and indirect taxes, payments for municipal services, costs of railroad tickets and duties, mandatory loans from the population and unpopular limitations on expenditures abroad during vacations. Mauroy claimed that the "second stage" of activity by the leftist government is a period of "temporary retreat" from the orientation of 1981. Speaking before delegates to the FSP [French Socialist Party] Congress, which took place in October 1983 in Bourg-de-Bresse, Mauroy stated: "The regime of 'harsh economizing' is a method. It is not the ultimate objective of policy."³ After the economic "normalization plan" is implemented and the worldwide capitalist economic crisis ends, Mauroy assured, a "third stage" of activity by the leftist government, a period of economic upswing, reforms and a policy of "social justice" will begin. Calling upon the leftists to shift to "managing the reforms made," on 25 March 1983 Mauroy declared: "We will gather our harvest in 1985 and 1986."

But in FSP circles there was also another approach to the policy of "harsh economizing." M. Rokard, minister of agriculture, and several other members of the Mauroy Cabinet (Delors; L. Fabius, minister of industry and research; and others) viewed the government's stabilizing program not as a "phase of consolidation" or a "social pause," but as a long-term strategy. Speaking in early 1984 at a forum organized by L'EXPANSION, a journal of business circles, Delors stated: "For two more years our economy must grow more slowly than those of other states. France must adopt the West German model, which is based on increased exports and capital investments, and not consumption."⁴ The logic of this policy led to a situation in which the function of "transformer of society", set down in a number of FSP program documents,⁵ was put back to second, or even third priority, and the French socialists functioned in the capacity of "managing the affairs" of capitalist society.

Thus, analysis of the "second stage" of the leftist government's activity raises a number of important problems. How economically effective is the policy of "harsh economizing?" What are its social, ideological and political consequences?

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

The "Delors Plan" had some influence on inflation rates and French foreign trade and payments balances, but did not bring expected success. Owing to the growth of French exports caused by the start of an economic upswing in the West, in 1983 France was able to decrease her foreign trade deficit to 43 billion francs (93 billion in 1982). But a new increase in the dollar's exchange rate in 1984; an increase in the requirements of French industry for purchase of the latest technology abroad; inadequate competitiveness of French goods and the need to service previously acquired debts complicate the task of equalizing the country's trade and monetary balances.

A decrease in inflation took place -- from 14 percent in 1981 to 9.2 percent in 1983. But the gap in inflation rates between France and her main foreign trading partners was practically unchanged. In spring 1982 it was 6 points, and at the end of 1983 5 points. Price increases were 6.7 percent in 1984 (and not 5 percent as the government assumed). Meanwhile, France failed to

eliminate the gap with the FRG, its main rival. At the end of 1984 this gap was 4 points.⁶ The other side of the effect of the "Delors Plan" was a reduction in payment demand. The purchasing power of wage earners fell in 1983 by 0.5 percent and continued to decline in 1984. It is entirely probable that the purchasing power of the workers will fall again this year. In May 1984, Delors asserted that in 1985 a regime of "harsh economizing" would be introduced which would be incomparable with 1984.

Due to reduced domestic demand, the VVP growth rate fell from 1.9 percent in 1982 to 0.5 percent in 1983. The cyclical phase of improvement, which began in 1984 in a number of capitalist countries, enabled France to avoid economic recession, but the country lags behind the world market conditions "diagram".

It is clear that the effectiveness of the "Delors Plan" largely depends on tendencies in the development of the worldwide capitalist economy and on world economic conditions. French leftist economist (A. Lipets) wrote: "The policy of 'harsh economizing,' which the countries of the South were already forced to carry out in 1984, is depriving France of major contracts totalling 40 billion francs. If the U. S. would also decide to restore its trade balance, the French position would become truly dramatic."⁷

The government presented the "Delors Plan" as the only alternative to the "foreign policy isolation" of France, and as the only opportunity to preserve foreign economic relations with its Western European partners. "France cannot carry out a purely leftist policy if the other European countries are carrying out a rightist policy,"⁸ stated Mauroy.

But drafts of another economic policy, called upon to reduce French foreign economic dependence, were also being advanced in the leftist camp. The FSP left wing (SERES) rejected a return to "old monetarist recipes." Jean Pierre Chevenement, its leader, wrote: "Everyone knows that the final escape from the crisis is possible only on the international level. But this does not mean that for France there is no other prospect, besides escaping the crisis after America."⁹ SERES proposed to seek from France's partners an automatic, monthly reexamination of currency exchange parity. If they refuse, France must leave the European currency system, which Chevenement called "a zone in which the West German mark dominates." To eliminate the trade balance deficit, France must use the entire arsenal of defense of national industry (most of all articles 108 and 109 of the Rome Treaty about preserving national interests). To combat inflation, SERES called for reducing social inequality and strengthening control over the incomes of owners. The FSP left wing considered it necessary to regulate more severely the activity of the private sector. "Planned regulation" must take priority over the market.¹⁰ With the help of deficit financing and credit institutions, SERES proposed stimulating the effective demand of the population. It proposed rapidly modernizing industry on this basis, and shifting to high rates of economic growth.

SERES understood well the political consequences of the "Delors Plan." In May 1983 the authors of the SERES resolution for the FSP Congress assessed the government's policy taken in March 1983 as a "turnabout." In the long-term future its implementation poses the problem of "reexamining political strategy

-- that of an alliance of leftist forces and anticapitalist orientation, approved in Epinay in 1971, at the FSP founding congress."¹¹ SERES demanded no repudiation of socialist ideals and the acceptance of the challenges hurled at French leftist forces. The SERES resolution noted: "The government majority was able to construct a "foundation of changes." But construction does not conclude with the erection of a foundation. To be limited to the tasks of "management" means to acknowledge the fatal nature of the crisis. France needs not only management, but also a largescale national project, which only the left is capable of advancing."¹²

The Communist Party advanced a constructive alternative to the government's policy. Not minimizing the importance of the worldwide crisis and the fatal nature of its consequences for the French economy, the FKP [French Communist Party] at the same time put forth a number of measures having the aim of "weakening the fetters of foreign pressure."¹³ As one of the priority measures, the FKP put forth the task of enlivening economic activity and winning over the domestic market. This concerned sharply increasing capital investments in French industry, stopping the "flight of capital," and replacing imported goods with French ones. This policy was aimed at reducing unemployment, expanding internal consumption and protecting the workers' standard of living.¹⁴ Offering to restructure the exchange of trade with the capitalist countries, the FKP favored not autarchy, but the achievement of greater foreign economic independence. "Movement along this path," it was emphasized in FKP documents, "must be concluded in parallel with the development and ever greater diversity of our relations with countries of the 'third world' and the socialist states."¹⁵

For the sake of reducing inflation rates and the trade deficit the French government had to partly sacrifice its longterm program for modernizing French industry. According to LE MONDE, French industry is becoming the first victim of the policy of "harsh economizing."¹⁶ The tremendous sums extracted from the population went, essentially, to "plugging the gap" -- the government's budget deficit, nationalized enterprises deficit and social security funds deficit. Moreover, there was no integrated view in the French government on restructuring the economy. Since 10 May 1981, four ministers headed the Ministry of Industry and Research (Jacques, (Dreyfus), (Shevenman) and Fabius), who advanced differing programs for industrial development. Prior to coming to power, the FSP proposed implementing the "re-industrialization" of France, reestablishing industrial branches undermined by the 1970's policy of narrow "specialization," and "gaining back" the domestic market. The FSP hoped to achieve these aims by turning the expanded nationalized sector into a "strike force" for national industry, which would carry out its own planned restructuring of the French economy; and by creating "poles of growth" in branches closely linked with foreign trade. But all this was based on one postulate -- economic growth.

However, many French government calculations were not borne out. Thus far the nationalized sector has not fulfilled its tasks. Deficits in nationalized companies were much more imposing than the government first assumed. In 1981 the aggregate deficit of 11 nationalized groups was 12.5 billion Francs, and in 1982 it was 15 billion francs. Their financial base was seriously weakened. In order to support the nationalized companies, the state granted

them 14.9 billion francs in 1982 and 20.2 billion in 1983.¹⁷ The nationalized sector is still in a stage of reorganization (especially in such branches as ferrous metallurgy, basic chemicals and electronics). For a long time the government was unable to define clearly enough the economic strategy of the nationalized groups and the nature of their relations with the state. It vacillated between directive forms of control over the activity of the nationalized companies and the principles of their complete autonomy within the framework of long-term contracts, signed with the Ministry of Industry and Research. Due to the depressed French economy, the nationalized sector never became a "pole of development" for small and medium sized enterprises.

After the introduction of "harsh economizing" and the decline in VVP growth rates, the policy of re-industrialization "on all azimuths" became unrealistic. In early 1984 it was decided to refrain from subsidizing "chronically sick" branches, most of all mining, metallurgy and shipbuilding. A policy was adopted of completely rebuilding these branches on the basis of the latest labor saving equipment and technology was adopted. The government concentrated its efforts in the most promising areas. It was planned to allot 140 billion francs over five years for development of electronics, and programs were worked out for accelerated development of a number of other branches with the latest technology.

Modernizing industry was proclaimed the "absolute priority" (L. Fabius). At his press conference of 4 April 1984, President Mitterrand stated: "The future of France is inseparably linked to modernization. Either France is capable of dealing with competition and maintaining her independence and prosperity, or she will slide down an inclined plane and fail."¹⁸

Previously the FSP allotted to the state organs, nationalized sector and planning the decisive role in transforming the economic structures. Back in 1978 Mitterrand asserted that he believed "in the advantages of a plan over the market." But the latest speeches of many FSP leaders more and more often contain calls for reduced state control over enterprise activity. In essence this means a search for "partnership" relations with the bourgeoisie within the framework of a "mixed economy" and a rejection of attempts to force the entrepreneurs to "compromise" on its terms and from a position of strength.

Restraining the growth of wages, the Mauroy government tried to increase the profit norm and the self-financing norm of the enterprises. For the sake of a compromise with patronage it met a number of demands of the entrepreneurial circles. In November 1982 Mauroy reported the adoption of measures to ease the tax burden on enterprises. Payments on bank loans by enterprises were reduced, new tax benefits for investors were introduced, etc. The government also declared its intention to change the system of financing family allowances before 1988, to free gradually the entrepreneurs from the duty of paying family allowance and charge their financing to the state, having raised direct taxes. According to the "Delors Plan," the policy of "harsh economizing" is limited by the reduction of consumer demand, not touching enterprise profits. As a result of all these measures, in 1984 the share of profits in realized value was restored almost to the pre-crisis level.

However, the new economic policy of the Mauroy Government did not halt the "strike of capital investments," being practiced by the private sector. According to a poll of the journal, L'EXPANSION, taken at the end of 1982, only 6 percent of the entrepreneurs planned to increase production capacities in 1983, while 32 percent planned to reduce them.

The bourgeoisie were prepared to trust Mitterrand only if the "social compromise" were supplemented by a "political compromise." According to a poll taken in December 1982 by the same journal, to gain its trust it was clearly insufficient for Mitterrand merely to form a government of socialists alone. In this case 22 percent of its representatives were prepared to give more trust to the government. The big bourgeoisie demanded far ranging political concessions of the FSP: removing communists from government; replacing Mauroy in the post of prime minister with a more moderate socialist leader or a technocrat with no obvious political face; including centrists in government and conducting a social-economic policy in the spirit of the governmental policy of (R. Barr). Only if all these conditions were observed were 65 percent of the polled representatives of the big bourgeoisie prepared to return their trust to the government. Without gaining the support of the entrepreneurs, the new socio-economic policy at the same time worsened relations of the French government with the workers and their organizations.

SOCIAL REALITIES

The policy of "harsh economizing" and modernization of industry is giving rise to new social problems. That of unemployment has become most acute of these. The leftists came to power at the moment that the situation in the labor market changed and a direct fall in employment began, caused most of all by the introduction of the latest labor-saving technology.¹⁹ This process also continued during the period of the leftist government.

After the leftist government came to power, several steps were taken to improve the labor market. It used widely methods of "social control" of unemployment (in the expression of Mauroy): early retirement; increasing the duration of school education; creating vocational training centers for persons 16 to 18 years of age and organizing a system of apprenticeship in industry beginning at age 18. The growth of unemployment was somewhat slowed by these measures. From May 1981-May 1983 the unemployed among the active working population rose from 7.2 to 8.9 percent in France, while it rose from 4.2 to 9 percent in the FRG; from 7.6 to 10.3 percent in the U. S.; from 8.4 percent to 12.2 percent in Italy and from 8.9 percent to 12.3 percent in Great Britain. From May 1982-November 1983 unemployment in France was stabilized at a level of 2 million people. But at the end of 1983 the methods of "social control" of unemployment were exhausted. From June 1983-June 1984 French unemployment growth rate (14.4 percent) was highest in the EEC.²⁰

It became impossible to hold unemployment at a level of 2 million people, and beginning in November 1984 the number of unemployed registered by the national agency on employment began to rise, reaching 2,324,000 people by June 1984. Appeals by the French President, as well as by J. Ralite, ministerial delegate on unemployment issues, to supplement "social control" of unemployment with "economic methods" could not be realized due to the continuing decline of

capital investments. Many political figures began to be pessimistic in assessing future prospects for the struggle against unemployment.²¹

Social costs of the modernization strategy were higher than of the policy of "harsh economizing." The government's plan calls for reducing by half those employed in shipbuilding; eliminating 20,000-30,000 jobs in steelworking; 17,000-27,000 in coal and some 40,000 in automobile manufacturing.²²

The new wave of dismissals, caused by the reconstruction of traditional branches, is already striking part of the "central core" of the working class. In 1984, unemployment began to grow more rapidly among men than women, and more rapidly among workers age 25-49 than other age groups. It is striking skilled workers, white-collar workers, technicians and the lowest category of administrative workers harder than unskilled laborers and specialized workers.

The traditional industrial branches are concentrated primarily in several areas: Alsace, Lorraine, Brittany, the North, etc. Curtailing production in these branches caused social tension to rise in a number of regions. "Centers of anger and despair appear wherever economic mutations occur, which at times spread to entire provinces (Lorraine) or to individual city agglomerations ((Klermon-Ferran), (Olney), (Puassi))."²³

The new socio-economic policy caused increased unhappiness in the country. In summer 1982, after "harsh economizing" was introduced, pessimism replaced the "state of euphoria," which characterized mass consciousness immediately after the victory of the leftist forces. According to data of the public opinion institute, SOFRES, in August 1982 more than half of those polled (51 percent) stated that the government's economic policy was "moving in a bad direction," (and only 33 percent said "in a good direction").²⁴

The two main bourgeois parties, Rally for the Republic (OPR) [RPR] and the Union for French Democracy (SFD) [UDF], developed a broad political attack against the Mauroy Government. Their leaders expanded ties with the conservative organizations of farmers, artisans, tradesmen, small businessmen, doctors, individuals in the free professions, advocates of retaining private schools, and with the reactionary police unions.

In their fight with the government they widely used methods borrowed from leftist or even extreme leftist groupings: demonstrations, sit-down strikes, civil disobedience campaigns, street clashes. The national union of small and medium industry (NSMSP), a reactionary organization of small and medium sized entrepreneurs, held a number of demonstrations (in Strasbourg, Grenoble, Rouen and Limoux), tried to seize the VKT [World Confederation of Labor] building in Lille, set up road blocks on highways and railroads, etc. In September 1982, 20,000 owners of small and medium sized enterprises, united in NSMSP, conducted a torch-light procession in Paris. Simultaneously a demonstration of representatives of free professions took place at the initiative of the national center of physicians' unions and the national alliance of associations of free professionals. A wave of strikes swept over state hospitals. Truckers conducted several largescale roadblocks on the country's most important roads. All these incidents were manifestations of the anti-government mood and readiness to do battle of these strata.

Starting in the second half of 1982, disappointment with Mauroy Government policy intensified among the workers as well. A substantial gap formed between the hopes of broad strata of the population for concrete improvements in their living conditions and the real results of the government's social policy. According to data from a poll conducted by L'EXPANSION in January 1983, 51 percent of the workers claimed that the government "had not kept its pre-election promises" (and only 34 percent that it "had kept them")²⁵

Worker dissatisfaction was expressed ever more often in sharp class conflicts. A strike by specialized workers broke out at (Tal'bo) automobile firm in Poissy in autumn 1983. In early 1984 a large miners' strike for jobs took place and government employees took to the streets of Paris, struggling to preserve their purchasing power. Finally, in April 1984, workers in Lorraine fought against the government plan to reorganize the metallurgy industry.

After "harsh economizing" was introduced the workers' trade unions initially retained their favorable attitude toward the Mauroy Government. The largest trade union centers recognized the acuity of the economic crisis and agreed with the need to conduct a new policy in the area of wages and eliminate the social security account deficit. Demanding that worker purchasing power be preserved, they, however, showed some moderation in their criticism of the government's policy. Their opposition to particular aspects of Mauroy's socio-economic policy did not compare with their categorical condemnation of the activity of the previous administration.

But, as the "harsh economizing" policy was implemented, the leftist trade unions took more and more critical stances with respect to the government's policy. As a result of the industrial "modernization" program, adopted in early 1984, workers in those branches which, historically, had comprised the bulwark of the trade unions found themselves under attack: metal workers, miners, shipbuilders, automobile workers.

The World Confederation of Labor, the country's leading trade union center, switched to sharp criticism of the government's policy. After strikes by miners and state employees, (A. Krazyuki), VKT general secretary, warned that these actions were not merely a "momentary flareup." VKT activists, he stated, "are more and more decisively entering the struggle."²⁶ In connection with reorganizing the metallurgical industry, (Krazyuki) stated that the VKT was in conflict with the government and appealed for mass demonstrations in support of the metalworkers' demands. Other trade union centers also demonstrated dissatisfaction. The leaders of the reformist trade union, Force Ouvriere, asserted that the "modernization" policy was leading to "a breakdown of social equality," and (E. Mer), general secretary of the leftist trade union center, FDKT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor], emphasized that the government had made employment the victim of "harsh economizing." (Mer) levied the accusation against the government that its industrial policy was not integrated, and that it was being implemented from the top down in an air of secrecy, without prior consultation with the trade unions.

The "technocratization" of the regime and its isolation from the workers and democratic movement weakened the cohesion of the alliance of leftist forces,

and put in question the possibility of preserving the government agreement between the FKP [French Communist Party] and the FSP.

DEPARTURE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY FROM THE GOVERNMENT

The FKP strategy combined support for the positive transformations being carried out by the government with insistence on an independent party policy and expanded activity among the masses.

In its capacity as a "party of struggle," the FKP tried to carry out maximum mobilization of the masses. "The workers," stressed J. Marchais, "must take matters in their own hands; they cannot wait while all issues are decided from above..."²⁷ In its capacity as a "government party," the FKP supported each government step in a positive direction. The President of the Republic and prime minister always gave the communist ministers their due, noting their "energy" and "activeness." In July 1983, Mauroy stated that "the communist ministers are outstanding ministers."²⁸

The energetic activity of the communist ministers and their "innovative" leadership style, based on knowing the specific problems of French workers, had considerable political and propaganda effect. In their ministerial posts the communists proved their competence and selflessness. They were conduits for a number of important reforms in French social life. At the initiative of C. Fiterman, minister of transportation, a law was adopted regulating competition among the various types of transportation; the structure of the railroad administration was democratized; the commercial policy of state aviation companies was revised, etc. Under his leadership a decree was adopted which shifted to users part of the transportation costs of the residents of Paris and its suburbs. Being minister of health, J. Ralite prepared legislation which created conditions for eliminating the private sector in state hospitals. Having become minister of labor in March 1983, Ralite developed a new type of labor agreement which combined employment, vocational training and increased production. In his post as minister of vocational training, M. Rigout organized apprenticeship for school graduates lacking either a trade or diploma. Approximately a million people, age 16-25 completed the "Rigout course." A. Lepors, secretary of state to the prime minister for Civil Service and Administrative Reform, contributed greatly to developing a new law on the status of government service. Adopted on 19 January 1983, this law expanded political rights of government employees, abolished statutes introduced by the previous administration which regulated the right to strike in government service, and equalized the rights of workers in local organs of government with state officials. At Lepors' initiative, a reform of the national administrative school was carried out and recruitment of high officials was somewhat democratized.

Combining participation in government with mass struggle and with organizing pressure on the government from the proletariat, the communists constantly defended their class ideology and revolutionary ideals. They criticized those government measures which conflicted with the 1981 electoral commitments. The Communist Party expressed disagreement with the measures taken in summer 1982 to freeze prices and workers' wages, made a number of qualifications with respect to the "Delors Plan," and sharply criticized several aspects of the

government's foreign policy: Paris' support for the NATO decision to deploy American missiles in Western Europe; refusal to count French nuclear forces in the overall balance of the West and military intervention in Chad.

After the Mauroy Government adopted its program of "modernizing" traditional branches of industry, the government's socio-economic policy, especially the problem of employment, became the main source of dispute between socialists and communists. As a symbol of disagreement with the policy of reducing coal production and mass laying off of miners, (J. Bal'bon), member of the FKP Central Committee, resigned his post as coal industry head. At its January 1984 plenum, the FKP appealed to the government to show "more firmness in the face of pressure from rightist forces and entrepreneurs." The FKP asserted that in metallurgy, shipbuilding and coal there was "no excess work force." In its opinion, "the present industrial restructuring requires not a reduction, but to the contrary an increase in the number of jobs in production." On 31 March 1984 the FKP called the plan to reorganize the metallurgy industry a "tragic error" and demanded its reexamination.²⁹

Government socio-economic policy corresponded less and less with Mitterrand's pre-election commitments and the government agreement concluded by the FKP and FSP on 23 June 1983 and renewed on 1 December 1983. The Communist Party called for a return to the 1981 commitments, but in FSP governing circles social reforms and the battle against unemployment were sacrificed to economic stabilization and industrial "modernization."

Before autumn 1983, Mauroy acknowledged that FKP criticism was a normal phenomenon within the framework of "democratic discussion," and that each left majority party had a right to express its opinion on various aspects of government policy. However, after the government adopted its plan for "reconstruction" of traditional branches, the FSP began to acknowledge the FKP right to hold an independent policy only in the sphere of foreign policy. In the opinion of (L. Zhospen), the FKP and FSP should display "much greater solidarity" in matters of domestic policy. In April 1984, Mauroy excluded the possibility for continuation of "systematic criticism" of governmental policy by the FKP. Thus, the FSP demanded that the FKP refrain from an independent policy on the most important problems of internal political life, touching the fundamental interests of leftist voters and activists. After the European elections, Mitterrand also rejected a number of reforms outlined by the left. In particular, he removed government legislation to reform the school education system from the parliamentary agenda.

When L. Fabius was named prime minister on 17 June 1984, the FKP confronted the question of whether to participate in the new government. It decided not to enter the Fabius Cabinet, while supporting at the same time those governmental measures which met the workers' interests. A FKP Central Committee statement noted that negotiations between a FKP delegation and Fabius showed that the government intended to continue its policy of "harsh economizing" which was leading to a further rise in unemployment and to a decline in living standards of broad masses of the population. In this situation, the FKP Central Committee statement emphasized, communists cannot remain in a government whose policy does not meet the hopes and aspirations of millions of French people.³⁰

REORIENTATION OF THE FSP AND WEAKENING OF ITS SOCIAL BASE

The coming to power of the People's Front caused a nationwide upsurge in France: a strike movement of unprecedented scale; mass demonstrations in support of leftist slogans and mobilization of the workers. In 1936 alone the number of members of SFIO [former name of French Socialist Party] doubled, reaching 200,000, and the FKP increased from 32,000 members in 1934 to 350,000 in 1937. The united VKT reached a record number (5 million).³¹

The present structural crisis gripping the capitalist countries decreased the opportunities for mass mobilization, having to some extent intensified the disunity of the working class, reduced to a degree the feeling of proletarian solidarity in its midst and caused an increase in moods of "group egoism" and corporativism.³² The crisis is creating invisible barriers between various strata of the population. Differing interests among them and at times opposition and conflict are manifested more and more often. The resolution of the 24th FKP Congress emphasizes: "The crisis is universal, but irregular in nature. Everywhere it is sowing simultaneously both disunity and solidarity. The basic contradiction between the workers and big capital is perceived by many as something far removed and abstract, and is hidden in crisis conditions by many conflicts, essentially fictitious, but tangible and of daily occurrence: between those who must regularly register at the labor exchange and those who have work; between those who must earn a living by temporarily replacing others or living from hand to mouth on chance wages, and those who have steady jobs with corresponding guarantees; between unskilled workers and engineers, technicians and office employees; between those who have had access to culture and education and those who have not; between the population of various regions; between immigrants and Frenchmen; between youth and adult workers; between men and women."³³

The FSP could not and, mainly, did not want to embark upon mobilizing the masses, resolutely overcoming their disunity and actively forming a feeling of class solidarity. Fearing the intensification of class conflict in the country, the socialists did not support the slogan put forth by the FKP of relying on the workers' initiative, and undertook a policy of "reforms from above." (J. Delfeaux), a member of the socialist party secretariat, stated: In 1936 there was popular support -- mobilization of the workers and a strong social dynamic. In 1981 the change of government was implemented in a search for social peace. We wanted to preserve this social peace, despite the risk that an atmosphere of social passivity and demobilization of the masses would arise."³⁴

As a result the victory of leftist forces in 1981 did not lead to a "national upsurge" in the country. In early 1983, Mauroy noted that among supporters of leftist parties, "there are more observers than participants in the process of change." During 1981 and 1982 FSP strength increased by only 3.9 percent.³⁵ The activeness of its members fell. "The party subsided into slumber,"³⁶ a confidential FSP bulletin noted. "Life in the sections has become inert,"³⁷ wrote (J.-P. Cote), prominent FSP figure. The level of "syndicalism" in France remains one of the lowest in the developed capitalist countries. Negative tendencies remain in the organized workers' movement; tendencies which arose as a result of the economic crisis: lower trade union membership;

apathy among members and activists; reduced support by the masses for trade union slogans, etc.

The socialist party itself did not have sufficiently strong links with the trade union movement. It failed to institutionalize its relations with the trade unions.³⁸ This resulted in the regime being out of touch with the workers' movement and even in a lack of understanding between the trade unions and the FSP. Thus, many ministers of the Mauroy Government perceived the strike by workers in the private Peugeot Company, who were struggling for recognition by the administration of the lawful rights of the workers, as "sabotaging the national economy."

The Mauroy Government was not able to mobilize the masses even with the help of the new social movements: ecology, regional and feminist. After 1981 the leftist government met a number of their demands (decentralized the system of state administration, created an atomic energy commission, etc.); named activists in these movements to responsible government posts and financed feminist organizations.³⁹ But government policy boiled down to integrating the new social movements into the state apparatus, and not to encouraging their initiative and independent action.

During the period of the People's Front, energetic participation in social life by the working class and democratic movement was combined with an active position taken by the intellectuals. After 1981 the new government had no doubt of the support of the intellectuals. But already in July 1983 the well-known historian and writer, M. Gallo, who took the post of secretary of state, government spokesman, accused the intellectuals of "silence," in that they "went off to Aventinus Hill" and "disarmed" in the face of ideological attack from the right. Gallo even came to the conclusion that the electoral success of May-June 1981 came in a "decline" of the wave of influence of leftist ideology, in a period of upsurge in "cultural counterrevolution" and rightist ideas.⁴⁰ Journalist (R. Bodjeau), who conducted a series of interviews with prominent French intellectuals, noted that the majority of them speak of their "disappointment" in the Mauroy Government. Philosopher (J. Delois), proclaiming his adherence to the leftist cause, at the same time noted that in the government's activity, "nothing could touch the intellectuals and mobilize them as such."⁴¹

All of these processes posed before the FSP leaders the problem of expanding their social base. Some FSP leaders (for example, (J. Popren)), appealed for consolidation of the left electorate. J. Chevenement proposed relying on national-patriotic feelings to expand the social base of the left coalition through those population categories presently under the ideological influence of the Gaullist Movement (farmers, artisans, traders, small and medium entrepreneurs, some "cadres"). M. Rocard's wing, to the contrary, considered it necessary to orient on "the modern middle classes," who were prepared to accept "modernist" slogans.

The main obstacle to implementing the strategy of "consolidation" is that government policy contradicts the main demands of the economically unstable groups of workers, unemployed and youth. These social categories voted for leftists in 1981 in the hope of securing greater social stability under

conditions of economic crisis. They were disappointed with the activity of the Mauroy Government most of all because they felt no specific results from its social policy in their daily lives, especially in combating unemployment. After the program of "modernizing" traditional branches was adopted, a true break formed between the government and these population categories. It was symbolized by a sharp decline in the influence of leftists in Lorraine and a significant weakening of electoral positions of the FSP among the unemployed and youth.⁴²

The chances of SERES realizing its strategy were small. As was noted above, petty bourgeois strata shifted to open opposition to the government, which, in this environment, was unable or did not dare to undermine the monopoly of rightist vocational organizations.

The prospects for the strategy of the "Rocardists" were less definite. Many elements of this strategy were taken up by the governing circles. Initially they were based on several goals of supporters of M. Rocard, the FDKT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] and other representatives of the "second left" (as it is customary to call them in France). "Libertarian" ideas of freedom and autonomy of the individual, self-administration, social experimentation and expanded access to spiritual and cultural riches were promoted in the area of civil life. In the social sphere they preached "solidarity" with low-paid categories of workers and the unemployed. Thus the FDKT was the most resolute advocate of shortening the work week without reducing the purchasing power of average and high income wage earners.

A number of the Mauroy Government's reforms -- decentralization of the system of state administration, increasing the rights of workers at enterprises ("Auroux Laws"), etc. -- appealed directly to engineering, technical and administrative workers ("cadres" in French terminology). FSP appeals to broaden participation of "cadres" in managing the economy and society and give them an opportunity for greater social, professional and creative growth, met with a wide response among engineer, technical and managerial workers, especially those at middle levels. According to a poll taken in October 1981, 57 percent of "middle-level cadres" believed that the "Auroux Laws" would give them more authority in the enterprise (and only 15 percent thought that their prerogatives would decrease).⁴³ But due to resistance from rightist forces in parliament and capitalists in enterprises, implementation of the "Auroux Laws" took place extremely slowly. In June 1983, only 30 percent of the enterprises obligated to sign agreements with their personnel in accordance with the "Auroux Laws" had done so. As a result, "cadres" felt little effect from the most important reforms of the Mauroy Government.

The ideas for "modernizing" the socio-economic structures advanced by the Mauroy Government were rather close to the ideological views of engineer, technical and administrative workers. According to a poll taken in September 1983, the majority of "cadres" considered it necessary to introduce the regime of "harsh economizing." But 68 percent of those polled stated that, due to the inconsistency of the government's economic policy, the material victims were in vain and were not leading to a way out of the crisis.⁴⁴ A symbol of the weakening of left positions in the new middle strata was their defeat in

the 1983 municipal elections in Grenoble, where in the 1960's and 1970's the "modernistic" program of the "second left" was worked out.

At the present time, a new ideology of French "social reformism" is developing, which can be termed as technocratic or Saint Simonist (according to the definition of (A. Lipets). Its credo boils down to strengthening the role of the state in the areas of international competition and reducing its functions in the social sphere, in the matter of redistributing national income.⁴⁵ Based on these ideas, prominent representatives of "Rocardism" ((P. Rozanvalon), (S. Juli)) and a number of technocrats, especially state sector managers ((R. Foru), (A. Minc), (S. Nora)) combined in the Saint Simon Fund, created in 1983.

The idea of "solidarity" was sacrificed to the policy of "modernization." As a result, even the FDKT could not fully support the ideology of the "second left" and the government's policy of "modernizing" industry.

In the 1970's, program principles for a "break with capitalism," a "class front," an alliance of leftist forces and "self-managing socialism" gave a certain originality to the FSP among the parties in the Socialist International. All of these slogans gradually began to disappear from the political dictionary of the FSP leaders. Speaking of the "failure of leftist myths," (A. Rishar), leader of the FSP right wing, stated: "Sacred cows are dropping like flies."

In their speeches, the French president and other FSP leaders try to fill the "ideological vacuum," which formed after the removal of the 1981 slogans, which were comparatively radical for present-day social democracy. Whereas the fundamental principle of the "Socialist Plan" -- the FSP program, approved at its national conference in early 1980 -- was "a break with capitalism," the thesis about "a society of mixed economy" became central in Mitterrand's new ideological plan. Commenting on this, several French journalists elevated the ideas set down by Mitterrand to the rank of a new philosophy -- "social Mitterrandism," "liberal-socialism," "left liberalism," etc.⁴⁶

The concept of a "mixed economy" is based on other ideas and values than the FSP program, which called for "a break with capitalism" and to "change life". In essence we are talking about a return to the traditional reformist program. Whereas in the late 1960's and early 1970's Mitterrand viewed the "mixed economy" merely as a necessary stage to building "the French way of socialism," now development of a "society of mixed economy" has in fact become the "political plan" of the French president. The well-known political scientist, (A. Turen), even considered the main service of the Mauroy Government to have been "freeing France from the socialist plan."⁴⁷

Mitterrand is trying to include typical bourgeois technocratic values in the FSP ideology (entrepreneurship, competition, risk, profit) and combine them with concepts popular among leftist forces: planning, nationalization, redistribution of power and responsibility.

However, the new values did not become widespread in the ranks of the FSP. On the eve of the last FSP Congress, which took place in autumn 1983, the

resolution of its right wing, which called for an open revision of the ideological foundations of the party, was supported by fewer than 5 percent of the activists. The reexamination of FSP ideology being implemented by Mitterrand is not fully understood even among his direct followers, who prefer to declare their ideological loyalty to the FSP principles worked out in the 1970's. (L. Jospin), FSP first secretary, stated that he "refuses to pronounce sentence on the principles and values of the socialist party, which some are calling for." While supporting the government policy of "harsh economizing," Mitterrand's followers at the same time oppose revisions in the party program.⁴⁸ "In ideology there are no compromises," asserted (J. Popren), FSP secretary.

This position also became an important political limitation on the process of ideological re-orientation of the socialist party. Even Mitterrand, stressed (S. Juli), the well-known journalist, "is forced to revise the ideological platform under a slogan of continuity with the 1981 program."⁴⁹

The new government slogans are ideologically disorienting the left electorate. (L. Jospin) emphasized that the leftist voters do not accept the values which the FSP leaders have recently begun to espouse. Broad circles of leftist voters are dissatisfied with the activity of the Mauroy Government. According to SOFRES data, in spring 1983 37 percent of those polled who supported Mitterrand in the second tier of presidential elections were "disappointed" with the results of his activity in the post of head of state.⁵⁰ By his present policy and program, Mitterrand is counting on raising his prestige among the electorate of the rightist parties. However, this does not give him direct political gain as the rightist voters remain within the orbit of influence of the bourgeois parties.

The right opposition, exploiting the FSP repudiation of a number of its ideological principles, unleashed a broad ideological offensive. The political clubs became "laboratories of ideas" of the opposition parties. In May 1982, 408 clubs were established in France (including 205 in Paris), and almost every week the official registration of a new club took place. Copying the experience of the "non-communist left" in the 1960's, when numerous political clubs arose at the initiative of the left activists, the right wing clubs began to struggle for "cultural hegemony" in French society, laying a claim to winning over from the left "power over the minds of the French people."

Opposition parties and right wing clubs are calling for a "conservative revolution." They are demanding "de-bureaucratization" of the economy, "freeing the productive forces from the tutelage of the state" and creating optimal conditions for market competition, having reduced the tax burden on enterprises and their payments into the social security fund. They are working out projects for returning the nationalized sector into private hands. "We are reexamining everything which was done in half a century in the area of nationalizing enterprises," it states in the RPR program.⁵¹ At the same time, authoritarian tendencies predominate in right opposition circles. Its leaders demand that the state ensure "order" in the country by strengthening the repressive apparatus and tightening the policy on immigrants.

The massive ideological attack by rightist forces, together with the ideological reorientation of the FSP created conditions for the growth of conservative moods. The number of people demanding less interference in the economy and more free enterprise increased from 33 percent in 1973 to 58 percent at the end of 1982. In September 1983, 62 percent of those polled stated that it was most necessary to improve the economic situation of enterprises, and only 23 percent said it was to raise the French standard of living. Fifty-six percent of those polled favored developing the private sector and only 25 percent the nationalized sector.⁵² In essence the ideological reorientation of the FSP weakened its positions in the struggle for "cultural hegemony" in French society.

The new tendencies in the development of mass consciousness had an impact on election results. In the municipal elections which took place in March 1983, the left parties, according to calculations of French political scientists, lost 4.5 percent of the votes as compared to the 1981 presidential elections. The weakening of their positions was the result of two processes. On the one hand, some of the voters who began to support the FSP only in the 1970's and retained centrist political objectives shifted to the side of the right parties. According to the data of French scholar (J. Jafre), in the first tier of municipal elections in 1977, 28 percent of the voters calling themselves "centrist" voted for the left, while in the first tier of municipal elections in 1983 only 18 percent did so. On the other hand, unhappiness of traditional leftist voters was manifested in growing absenteeism of workers, especially representatives of the working class and youth. The coexistence of two antagonistic camps -- left and right and their "impenetrability and impermeability," wrote well-known journalist, (J. Julyar), left only one opportunity for these voters to express their dissatisfaction -- to abstain. A shift to the other camp they "subjectively would view as treason and self-abnegation."⁵³

The phenomenon of absenteeism took on tremendous scale in the European elections of 17 June 1984, when 42.88 percent of registered voters abstained (in the European elections of 1979 the figure was 39 percent). The portion of those abstaining was much higher among leftist voters than rightist. But mobilization of rightist voters was better for the National Front, a far right extremist grouping, than for the joint slate of bourgeois parties headed by former minister of health, (S. Bey). Its slate received fewer than those of the SFD and RPR in the 1979 European elections (42.7 and 43.9 percent respectively). The National Front obtained 11 percent of the votes and sent 10 deputies to the European Parliament. Nationalism and chauvinism are the main political strategy of the National Front. It openly uses racist slogans in the election campaign (for example, "Frenchmen first; coloreds out of the country"). The social bulwark of the National Front is becoming those strata of the population and those political groups whose system of values is most characterized as chauvinist-authoritarian. For the first time in the 5th Republic, a rather strong party of the extreme right has arisen.

The leftist parties received overall 39 percent of the votes; i.e., fewer than even in the 1969 presidential elections, when they were weak and disorganized. The FSP, having obtained 20.8 percent of the votes, returned to the level of the 1973 parliamentary elections. It continued to lose both "centrist" and

"leftist voters. In the opinion of French sociologists, the FSP succeeded in preserving only the core of its traditional electorate.⁵⁴

The phenomenon of absenteeism struck hardest at the electoral base of the FKP, which obtained only 11.2 percent of the votes. It was noted at the 26-27 June 1984 FSP Central Committee plenum that the masses did not understand the strategy of the FKP. On the one hand, they viewed the FKP as a party which shared responsibility for the government's policy, and on the other did not see in it strength capable of influencing the government's policy. As a result the dissatisfaction of the masses was expressed in absenteeism and not in support for the FKP slate.⁵⁵ A similar assessment of the position of the masses was made in a report by (J. Marshey) at the 25th FKP Congress.⁵⁶

* * *

After the European elections the French president took a series of initiatives having the aim of introducing into the political strategy adjustments necessary to bring it into accord with the policy of "harsh economizing" which was being implemented. Mitterrand took from the parliament's agenda the government's legislation on reform of the middle schools; proposed to have a referendum on granting the president the authority to resort to a referendum in cases when legislation affects the sphere of civil liberties ("referendum on referendum"); and replaced the prime minister. After the 17 July 1984 retirement of Mauroy and Delors, the naming of Laurent Fabius as prime minister and the departure of the communists from the government, the "second stage" of Mitterrand's presidential legislation concluded. The new prime minister promised to follow the Delors policy in the socio-economic sphere. The Fabius Government adhered in the 1985 state budget to the logic of the regime of "harsh economizing." Thus the "temporary retreat" from the Mitterrand electoral program made in June 1982 and presented as a "consolidation phase" turned into a long-term strategy, a reorientation of socio-economic policy and a final rejection of the policy of social reforms.

Theses about the need for "modernization" of socio-economic structures and building a "society of mixed economy" became predominant in the government's ideological activity. Several symbolic gestures were made in the political area which responded to right wing desires. Fabius appealed for a display of "openness" toward opposition forces and for the seeking of topics which could unite all the French people. Thus, the "new phase" in the activity of the socialist government began.

FOOTNOTES

1. I. M. Bunin, "France: Difficult Changes (Results of the First Year of Activity by the Leftist Government)", RK & SM [RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNY MIR], 1983, No 3.

2. L'HUMANITE, 15 March 1984.

3. LE MONDE, 1 November 1983.

4. L'EXPANSION, 20 January 1984, No 231, p 18.
5. See for more detail, V. S. Gusenkov, "On Certain Ideological and Political Principles of the FSP", RK & SM, 1982, No 2.
6. PROJET, January 1984, No 184, pp 103-106; LES ECHOS, 20 December 1984.
7. MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, March 1984, p 16.
8. Cited in MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, April 1984, p 2.
9. LE MONDE, 11 May 1983.
10. Ibid., 2 June 1983,
11. Ibid., 11 May 1983.
12. LE MONDE, 2 June 1983.
13. KOMMUNIST, 1983, No 1, p 122.
14. See for more detail: E. A. Arsent'yev: "French Communist Party at a New Stage in the Struggle for the Workers Interests", RK & SM, 1983, No 4.
15. KOMMUNIST, 1983, No 1, p 117.
16. LE MONDE, 1 April 1983.
17. Ibid., 4 February 1983; PROJET, Sep-Oct 1983, No 178, p 818.
18. LE MONDE, 6 April 1984.
19. For more detail see: "Technologicheskkiye sdvigi, nayemnyy trud i rabocheye dvizheniye razvitiy kapitalisticheskikh stran" [Technological Advances, Wage Labor and the Workers' Movement in the Developed Capitalist Countries], Moscow, 1983, pp 137-197.
20. LE MONDE, 12 May 1983; L'HUMANITE, 26 July 1984.
21. L'HUMANITE, 19 July 1984; Ibid., 12 April 1984; LE MONDE, 24 February 1984.
22. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 31 March-1 April 1984.
23. LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 4 May 1984, p 20.
24. Ibid., 28 August 1982, p 26.
25. L'EXPANSION, 4 February 1983, p 39.
26. L'HUMANITE, 12 March 1984.

27. Ibid., 21 April 1983
28. Ibid., 4 August 1983.
29. L'HUMANITE, 18 January 1984; Ibid., 2 April 1984.
30. L'HUMANITE, 20 July 1984.
31. For more detail see: Yu. V. Yegorov: "Narodnyy front vo Frantsii" [People's Front in France], Leningrad, 1972; Ye. A. Kravchenko, "Narodnyy front vo Frantsii," Moscow, 1972.
32. For detail see: G. G. Diligenskiy, "Mass Socio-Political Consciousness of the Working Class in Capitalist Countries: Problems of Typology and Dynamics," RK & SM, 1984, No 2.
33. 24th French Communist Party Congress, Moscow, 1982, p 141.
34. LE MONDE, 20 January 1983.
35. Calculated according to: J. Kergoat, "Le parti socialiste" [The Socialist Party], Paris, 1983, p 367.
36. Cited according to: G. Mendel, "54 millions d'individus sans appartenance," Paris, 1983, p 187.
37. LE MONDE, 8 February 1983.
38. For more detail see: S. I. Velikovskiy, "The Socialist Party and Workers' Trade Unions in France," RK & SM, 1983, No 4.
39. A. Touraine, "State and Social Forces in Socialist France," Telos, Spring 183, No 55, p 182.
40. LE MONDE, 26 July 1983; M. Gallo, "La troisieme alliance pour un nouvel individualisme," Paris, 1984, p 115.
41. LE MONDE, 27 July 1983.
42. In the 1984 European elections, only 23 percent of the unemployed and 19 percent of the students voted for the FSP slate. See: NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 22 June 1984, pp. 28-29.
43. L'EXPRESS, 23 October 1981, p 45.
44. Ibid.
45. See, for example: A. Minc: "L'Apres -- crise est commence," Paris, 1982.
46. LIBERATION, 11 May 1984; LE MATIN, 11 May 1984; LE MONDE, 11 May 1984.
47. NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 11 May 1984, p 28.

48. LE MONDE, 13 May 1984; Ibid., 19 April 1984.
49. LIBERATION, 4 April 1984.
50. LE MONDE, 12-13 June 1983.
51. "Plan de redressement economique et social adapte par le RPR au Congres du 23 janv. 1983," Paris, 1983, p 9.
52. LE MONDE, 11 October 1983; L'EXPANSION, 7 October 1983, p 247.
53. REVUE POLITIQUE ET PARLEMANTAIRE, Mar-Apr 1983, No 903, p 68; POUVOIRS, 1983, No 128, p 157; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 29 April 1983, No 964, p 43.
54. REVOLUTION, 22 June 1984, No 225, p 12.
55. CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME, Jul-Aug 1984, p 18.
56. L'HUMANITE, 7 February 1985.

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Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYIY MIR in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 85 pp 173-178

[Article by M. Aparnikov: "On the Forefront of the Ideological Struggle"]

[Text] The task of all-round research of the processes taking place in the international workers' movement and the ideological and political positions of its regional and national detachments has always been at the center of the close attention of Soviet historical science, the representatives of which are guided by Lenin's instruction that it is necessary "with all available forces to collect, check and study objective data" indicating the "strength of various trends in the workers movement."¹ Under present conditions, marked by intensified conflict between imperialism and socialism, this task becomes especially urgent. The decisions of the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenum spoke of making scientific inquiry more active and raising all ideological work to the level of present-day demands: "Thorough analysis of new phenomena in international relations; the development of world socialism; the world revolutionary process; and new aspects of the general crisis of the capitalist system is required."²

The theoretical questions and practical tasks set by our party are accepted by Soviet scientists as a long-term program of scientific work and research. Let us discuss two scientific periodicals published by IMRD [Institute for the International Workers' Movement], AN SSSR [USSR Academy of Sciences], the reference work, International Workers' Movement,³ and the annual, "The Working Class in the World Revolutionary Process," published by IMRD, AN SSSR within the framework of the working commission on all-round cooperation of academies of sciences of the socialist countries, entitled "The Working Class in the World Revolutionary Process."

In developing both publications, IMRD, AN SSSR set for itself the task of satisfying as far as possible the growing interest in the urgent problems of the world revolutionary process and showing the characteristics of the modern international working class, the main tendencies of development of the communist movement, the main directions and prospects for class struggle in the capitalist states and the special features of the situation and activities of the working class in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Publication of the Annual began in the mid-1970's and that of the Reference at the very start of the 1970's, soon after the 1969 International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties, which indicated the need for a thorough accounting and analysis of the new phenomena and underlying processes taking place in contemporary capitalism and new aspects of imperialist tactics and strategy and of its struggle against the workers' movement. Since that time tremendous changes have taken place in the world. Under the conditions of the military-strategic balance between the USSR and U. S. and between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO achieved in the 1970's a turn began away from the "cold war" toward detente, which created a climate of trust in inter-state relations.

This period was also marked by profound, although frequently ambiguous socio-political advances in various areas of the world. Fascist regimes in Spain, Portugal and Greece were eliminated as the result of struggle by the masses. In Latin America the revolutionary-democratic forces gained victory in Nicaragua and Bolivia, and national-patriotic forces are waging an armed struggle against American imperialism and its henchmen in El Salvador. In Chili, popular efforts against the reactionary Pinochet regime are widening. In Asia, the Vietnamese people gained victory over the American aggressor and embarked upon peaceful construction. The foundations of a new life are being laid in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. In Iran the Shah's rule has been ended. In Africa the struggle of people's liberation forces is developing successfully in Angola, Libya, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Benin, Zimbabwe and Madagascar.

But despite the improving international situation the class nature of imperialist policy has in no way changed. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, imperialist circles, especially the U. S., wrecked detente, having intensified to levels unprecedented in the whole post-war period the boundaries of struggle between the two social systems and the two absolutely opposite world outlooks.

This is thoroughly reflected in research of the most important theoretical questions of the contemporary class struggle and international workers' movement, as well as in materials about specific countries published in the Annual and Reference.⁵ Virtually all issues of both publications are written about "hot" recent events and ongoing processes, the vigorous flow of which frequently devours some political platforms with lightning speed, substantially changes others and reforms still others. Their first scientific assessments present undoubted difficulty, which, as a rule, is being overcome successfully by the authors, the leaders among whom are major internationalist scientists. The work is distinguished by a wide range of research efforts, taking into account all the cause and effect relationships and dependencies, which have manifested themselves with particular strength under the current situation of the deepening crisis of capitalism. The authors rightly start from the fact that the arrangement of class forces in the world; level of political (or military) tension; level of trust among states; and opposition of military-political blocs are all interrelated with the general laws of the era and the world revolutionary process, but are characterized, naturally, by great fluctuation, changeability and pulsation, which unavoidably brings in many various situational adjustments. This is felt with particular acuity in

the abrupt bends and turns of political life, which are usually not limited to purely politically expedient changes, but signify fundamental changes in international objective conditions and the circumstances of social development as a whole.

In the structure of these interrelations the authors' attention is naturally focused on the influence which changes in the overall world situation have (or may have) on the development of the class struggle and the revolutionary processes, and on how these processes themselves impact on the formation of the international political climate. This methodological foreshortening makes it possible to examine the international situation, "first, as a definite sum of the class struggle and all social development in the preceding period; second, as an objective reality, under the conditions of which the given stages of the class struggle are unfolding; and finally, third, as an 'outward' prerequisite for its development in the near future."⁶

The structure of the publications is clear and logical. Whereas the Annual contains many types of materials: research, articles, scientific reports, historiographic surveys, information about new books, reports about scientific conferences, symposia and working group sessions, the Reference has three permanent headings: general theoretical, country oriented and reviews, where developmental tendencies of the trade union movement, the workers' strike struggle, etc., are analyzed.

The Reference is oriented on reporting the ongoing state of the international workers' movement. The Annual is called upon to accomplish essentially the same task, but by virtue of its specific nature, on an expanded chronological, problem-oriented, source-related and documentary basis, and that is why it devotes such close attention to questions of history and historiography.⁷ Considering that the Annual is published within the framework of the problem-oriented commission of multilateral cooperation among academies of sciences of the socialist countries, it would be useful, in our view, to expand the geographical scope of the materials published therein by including research accomplished, for example, by Mongolia and Cuba.

Another special feature of the Annual is that it always contains an analysis of the social and psychological aspects of the development of the international workers' movement and the problems of mass consciousness.⁸

It is necessary to give their due to the compilers of both publications. It was far from a simple matter to find the optimal composition and structure which subordinated different research interests and predilections to a single scientific publishing concept. The restrained sense of proportion given to general theoretical material and factual material reflecting specifics of individual countries is obviously skillful. At the same time, it seems to me necessary to have a clearer profile in the "survey" part of the Reference. Frequently it contains materials which, even greatly stretching the point, can in no way be called reviews. Thus, an article by Yu. A. Zhilin was published in the last issue entitled, "Contemporary Military-Political Alliances and the Communist Movement", which clearly belongs by content in the general theoretical section.⁹ It seems to me that the structure of the Reference is

excessively regulated, as it is necessary to resort to such transpositions, which negate the specificity of various section designations.

A strong editing and publishing tradition of putting together a great deal in a small space has been established. This is particularly noticeable in the Reference, the authors of which are permanently limited to a strict chronological framework (one or two years), with the only exception being the seventh issue of 1982, a sort of borderline issue. As a result it became possible in the series of editions of the Reference and Annual to summarize a tremendous amount of documentary and factual material and the constant introduction of many new sources into scientific circulation. These uncommon analytic efforts demand rapid, but never hasty, comprehension of this material, behind which are concealed complex, far from unambiguous processes, frequently, as previously mentioned, in their initial, embryonic stage. To disclose them, pin them down and trace the dynamic of their subsequent development -- this is the basic research task facing the authors' collective. Therefore, each edition of the Reference and Annual opens up in its own way new horizons in the development of the international workers' movement, consistently and purposefully orienting the reader to the most important and urgent problems of the world revolutionary process.

In this regard, one cannot help but note one natural development -- the increased attention being paid to the methodological and scientific investigative aspect of theoretical materials, which frequently represent the product of many years of labor. This is graphically displayed, for example, in the measured, deeply thought out combination of the general and the specific in analysis of the relationship between the socialist ideal and its realization in the presently existing socialist states. This analysis is based on Lenin's thinking that, "only through a number of attempts, each of which taken individually will be one-sided and suffer from a certain discrepancy, will pure socialism be created from the revolutionary cooperation of the proletariat of ALL countries."¹⁰

The authors analyze problems which reflect the dialectic of the establishment and development of real socialism and its successes and difficulties, disclosing not only the main, but also accompanying factors, which define the mosaic of the entirety of the varied, far from completely coinciding experience of the countries of the socialist community. They show graphically, not by scholastic discourse, but by the convincing concrete nature of social practice, that present-day real socialism in its entirety corresponds unconditionally to the impression about it formed through study of the creative work of Marx, Engels and Lenin. For all the basic conclusions which they reached are confirmed by history.¹¹

The Reference and Annual present in a multi-faceted way a topical theoretical and ideological-political analysis of the current phase of the aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism and the special features inherent to it, which directly impact on the struggle by the working class against the monopolies. In the economic sphere these features boil down most of all to three modified forms of manifestation of the crisis development of capitalism. This refers to the intensified crisis of the worldwide capitalist division of labor; the crisis of methods of state monopoly regulation; and the crisis of

the capitalist type of implementation of the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution. The authors' approach characteristically takes into account the numerous and varied factors and relationships which, in the aggregate, predetermine the direction in which the crisis processes are moving.¹² Thus, the crisis of the world capitalist division of labor is viewed through the prism; first, of the incompatibility of its contemporary capitalist forms (trans-national corporations and state monopoly integration) with the objective needs of the internationalization of productive forces; second, of the weakened ability of the centers of capitalist development to maintain themselves, on the one hand, with deliveries of cheap raw materials and energy, and on the other hand, with the required level of demand for their products, through use of tested means of economic and non-economic pressure; third, of the growing conflict among the three main centers of modern imperialism -- the U. S., Western Europe and Japan, and; fourth, of the prospects revealed for the formation of a new concentration of financial and industrial might based on an alliance of ruling circles in several oil producing and raw materials exporting developing countries and the trans-national corporations which have rushed there.¹³

Multidimensional understanding of capitalist reality is distinguished by analysis of the qualitatively changing structure of mass unemployment.¹⁴ Formerly most unemployed were older workers of limited capacity, of low or completely obsolete qualifications, and persons unable or not desiring to be retrained. The share of declassé elements embodying the lowest social strata was comparatively great. Today, unemployment, which stems mainly from releasing the work force as a result of restructuring the production base, has spread to an entirely different type of workers. They are, on the one hand, young people with a high level of education who lacked an opportunity to find employment in industry after finishing school due to the absence of vacancies, and on the other hand, semi-skilled and skilled workers in large-scale professions the need for which is rapidly declining. Both are distinguished from the older type of unemployed by their developed structure of needs and high level of social activeness.

The authors stress that the situation regarding employment is impossible to view in isolation from the changing work force quality needs of industry which is undergoing restructuring. It is all the more important to clarify this question because here many tendencies are interwoven, including some which are contradictory in their thrust. In particular, new technology and new equipment demand from the worker a high level of general and professional training, an ability and readiness to change specific working functions, and initiative and independence in making decisions. The worker who meets these requirements is the one who has modern high qualifications. At the same time the number of jobs requiring workers of this type remains limited, and their share of overall wage labor is relatively small.

At the same time, it seems to us that the materials published in both publications do not fully reflect the level and state of research of modern processes of marginalization in the capitalist countries. These processes are analyzed primarily within a framework of general theoretical articles. Specialized works devoted to this problem are clearly insufficient, given all its importance.¹⁵

Each volume of the Reference and Annual contains most valuable analytical information about new tendencies and processes in the world communist movement, which are appraised based on the methodological premise: commonality is not reduced to sameness, and variety in no way signifies an absence of laws held in common. The authors rely on a typology of the world revolutionary process, consistently developed and reflected in the basic multi-volume work, "Mezhdunarodnoye rabocheye dvezheniye. Voprosy istorii i teorii" [The International Workers' Movement. Questions of History and Theory]. They examine in dialectical interrelation and integrity a number of the most important questions related to the daily struggle which the vanguard parties conduct for democratic transformations; expanded actions by the working class in defense of their vital rights and interests; and the creation of broad anti-monopolistic fronts. The success of this struggle largely depends on relations between communists and social democrats. Materials published on this topic constantly contain the thought that social democracy is a complex and contradictory party-political formation, and a movement which is developing in far from a straight line.¹⁶ These materials give a thorough evaluation of the social and economic strategy of social democracy, and show the duplicity of the solutions which it proposes. Forced to maneuver between two social poles, the social democrats constantly experience the powerful influence of antagonistic forces. Therefore, expressing the everyday interests of the working class and the workers, it at the same time conducts a policy dictated by its inherent involvement in the superstructures of state monopoly capitalism. The various issues of the Reference and Annual also define the real correlation between the foreign policy "aktiv" and "passiv" of international social democracy and the special features of the attitude of its national detachments toward the problems of war and peace, disarmament and the antiwar movement. The authors avoid one-sided assessments, giving notice that the domestic and foreign policy platforms advanced by social democrats may be the subject not only of criticism, but also of dialogue with them.

In connection with this, there is a need to improve the methodological and theoretical capability of the critics of social reformism. The prospects for cooperation between communists and social democrats largely depend on the degree to which this is accomplished. Apparently it is necessary to increase the efforts of researchers in this area and, correspondingly, reflect more regularly the results of scientific works on the pages of both publications.

The problems of the political orientation of trade unions and their relations with the parties, both ruling and opposition, which have taken shape historically and are developing quite differently in various countries, are thoroughly brought to light in the publications. Various forms of relationships among these organizations exist, which reflect most of all the specific historical conditions in which they operate; special features of the socio-economic and political contradictions of modern state monopoly capitalism; the level of class self-consciousness in the workers' movement of a given country; the correlation of forces within it, etc.

Under conditions of the crisis development of capitalism, the struggle of trade unions to satisfy the social and economic demands of the workers and to oppose attempts by the monopoly bourgeoisie to shift the burden of the crisis

onto their shoulders is unavoidably intertwined with the political struggle. The functions of trade unions are expanding and becoming more complex. The nature of mass actions by the working class; degree of its decisiveness in social conflicts; strength and effectiveness of its blows upon monopoly capital; as well as the limits of its opportunities to unite all leftist and democratic trends in an anti-monopolist front in order to change the correlation of antagonistic forces and realize thorough transformations in capitalist society depend largely on this.

As they provide numerous examples of the vanguard, mobilizing role of communists in the development of mass struggle for the vital interests of the workers, the authors also strive to disclose social democratic political and socio-psychological influence on the thrust of actions by the working class. The new upsurge in the class struggle in recent years, increase in mass workers' actions and expansion of their social composition indicate eloquently the narrowing of opportunities to use extreme right wing forms of social reformist conciliation. The growing radicalization of the masses and the "crisis of confidence" with respect to the policy of reconciliation of class antagonisms afford additional opportunities to introduce, in the words of Lenin, "class determination and consciousness into the dizzy vortex of events."¹⁷

The Annual and Reference are also characterized overall by a high level of scientific, literary and editorial sophistication.

Through the years these publications have become a serious school of scientific work for the young authors participating in them, who have learned (and are continuing to learn) mobility of investigative analysis and the ability to see the general beyond the particular and to master new strata of problems.

I would also like to make a few general remarks. In contrast to the Annual, the Reference does not fully take into account the importance of culture as a factor having serious influence on the processes taking place in the international workers' movement.¹⁸ In both publications materials devoted to modern varieties of anticommunism require greater quantity, systematization and more thorough analysis. This would facilitate raising the level of theoretical-methodological facts and argumentation available to critics of anticommunism. After all, it is no secret that a number of books and articles on this problem, even though they stress the importance of taking into account the specific historical nature of the current ideological situation in the struggle with anticommunism and discuss the need for its systematic and differentiated analysis, frequently contain oversimplified views about the anticommunist content and alignment of the two types of reformism -- bourgeois and social democratic -- equating them almost without qualification, in particular and in international affairs. This is why the role of both scientific periodicals is so great in presenting a methodologically precise and well thought-out explanation of the phenomenon of anticommunism, which takes into account all of its variety and ambiguity. Under conditions of growing international tension and intensification of ideological confrontation, special meaning is taken on by Lenin's instruction about the need to differentiate among "the views of direct enemies, hidden enemies, the

undecided and indecisively 'sympathetic' people..."¹⁹ Life is confirming the methodological value and urgency of Lenin's warning that "to forget the uniqueness of political and strategic relations and reiterate, whether appropriate or not, merely the trite little word, 'imperialism,' is not Marxism at all."²⁰

In the light of this it would be useful to expand the structure of the publications (or of one of them) by adding a permanent, independent section devoted to the special features of the ideological struggle in the present-day world, having in mind most of all the fact that anticommunism, being a phenomenon just as complex as it is varied, does not stay the same but undergoes a definite evolution. In the Reference one also sees an element of randomness in the selection of materials by countries, some of which (we are not speaking about the largest) are discussed in almost every issue, while others are discussed with extreme rarity. At times materials on individual countries are structured according to a simplified kind of "phenomenological" analytical scheme, which is oriented primarily on describing phenomena and recounting events and facts. Such analysis cannot help but "spin one's wheels:" The fundamental links among phenomena and general social tendencies remain undisclosed.

And just a few more wishes. The Reference would be more complete, it seems to me, with a permanent bibliographic section devoted to the ongoing state of research into the problems of the world revolutionary process and having the purpose of providing significant assistance to a wide circle of readers. The great scope of antiwar actions makes it necessary to introduce in one of the publications something like a "Chronicle of the Antiwar Struggle of the Masses," with analytical stress on what is new in workers' actions against the threat of global thermonuclear catastrophe. The time has come to think about publishing, at the end of the 1980's, a separate (perhaps even expanded) summary issue of the Reference, which sums up the development of the international workers' movement over two decades, both on the theoretical plane, and from the point of view of specific changes which have taken place in its national ranks.

These remarks and views, however, are not meant to demean the overall high evaluation of the work of the editors and authors of both publications. The thorough development of the problems posed and the scientifically based conclusions contained therein have great practical importance for explaining the leading tendencies and prospects for development of the international workers', communist and national liberation movement.

The genre of the publications, which in letter and spirit excludes the concept itself of a social periphery, and where everything is important and interrelated, imposes a high responsibility. The work of improving them, as recent issues indicates, is unceasing. Both publications are distinguished not merely by their natural inclination toward the new but, more importantly, by heightened investigative interest in everything which helps to reveal these new phenomena, their sources and fundamental interrelationships.

This unique scientific publishing experiment has fully justified itself. The publications have avoided the danger of becoming synopsisized reprints of

phenomena and facts. The Reference and Annual have gained a reputation as publications which depict extensively and reliably the various currents of international events and diverse slices of social life in dozens of countries in which the organized working class and its communist vanguard are having more and more influence.

There is no reason to doubt that all who are interested in the problems of the international workers' movement and the ideological struggle in the contemporary world will retain their keen taste for these publications.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Works], Vol 25, p 245.
2. "CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 14-15 June 1983, Moscow, 1983, p 191.
3. Editors-in-chief: V. V. Zagladin and B. I. Koval'; editors: A. A. Galkin, Ye. V. Iyerusalimskaya, A. V. Nikol'skiy, T. T. Timofeyev. See further the Reference for the year indicated.
4. Editors: A. A. Galkin (editor-in-chief), T. T. Timofeyev, M. A. Zaborov, Yu. M. Ivanov (deputy editor-in-chief). See further the Annual for the year indicated.
5. See: P. N. Fedoseyev, "A Most Important Factor of Social Development," Yezhegodnik [Annual], 1982; V. V. Zagladin, A. A. Galkin, B. I. Koval' and T. T. Timofeyev, "The Working Class and Development of the Worldwide Revolutionary Process," Spravochnik [Reference], 1982.
6. B. I. Koval', "Start of the 1980's: Complication of the International Environment and the Class Struggle," Spravochnik, 1984, pp 31, 34.
7. We will name only a few of the substantive articles and materials published in recent years: Ye. G. Plimak, "From the History of the Formation of Marxist Theory and the Tactics of the Proletarian Revolution (1848-1895);" Ya. S. Drabkin, "The German Revolution of 1918-1919 in the Contemporary Struggle of Ideas," Yezhegodnik, 1980; (Sh. Lakosh) (Hungarian People's Republic), "The Hungarian Soviet Republic and Problems of the Formation and Development of the Power of the Working Class;" M. A. Birman, "The Bulgarian Proletariat After the First World War: Increase in Size and Change of Structure;" M. A. Zaborov, "Survey of French Bibliographic Literature on the History of the Workers' and Communist Movement," Yezhegodnik-1981; L. A. Galkina, "On Several Discussions in the Fabian Society," Yezhegodnik-1982; L. I. Gintsberg, "Ideological 'Drift' of German Social Democracy in the 1920's;" (G. Shteyner) (Austria), "Historical Lessons (Toward an Assessment of the Legacy of Otto Bauer);" V. K. Kolomiyets, "Public Opinion Polls as a Source for the Study of the Political Orientations of Italians at the End of the 19th and Start of the 20th Centuries," Yezhegodnik-1983; L. Ye. Kertman and P. Yu. Rakhshmir, "The Establishment of Bourgeois Reformism;" V. Ya. Shveytser, "Austrian Marxism in Search of a 'Third Path'," Yezhegodnik-1984.

8. V. P. Iyerusalimskiy, "The FRG Working Class and the Crisis of the 1970's (Several Aspects of Social Psychology and Mass Consciousness)," Yezhegodnik-1981; K. G. Kholodkovskiy, "Social-Political Consciousness and the Behavior of the Middle Strata," Yezhegodnik-1982; V. Ya. Vul'f, "Old 'New Leftists' and Tendencies of Mass Consciousness in the U. S." Yezhegodnik-1983.
9. The same can be said about a number of other articles published earlier, for example: Yu. A. Vasil'chuka, "Militarism and the Working Class in Western Europe: Social and Economic Aspect of the Problem," Spravochnik [Reference] - 1982.
10. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 36, p 306.
11. V. V. Zagladin, "The Socialist Ideal, Real Socialism and the Communist Movement," Spravochnik-1984, p 15. See also: N. A. Shlenova, "The Working Class in the CEMA Countries -- Builder of Socialism and Communism," Spravochnik-1980; (V. Berets) (Hungarian People's Republic), "Marxism-Leninism and Real Socialism," Yezhegodnik-1980; E. V. Klopov and A. N. Andrukovich, "Increased Educational Level of the Working Class and the Social Development of Soviet Society," Yezhegodnik-1982; (A. Bem) and (L. Pal) (Hungarian People's Republic), "Tendencies of Development of the Hungarian Working Class," Yezhegodnik-1983; E. V. Klopov and V. A. Sautkina, "Toward the Study of the Strata of Leading Workers in the USSR (Methodological and Sociological Problems)," Yezhegodnik-1984.
12. See: A. A. Galkin, "Aggravation of the Contradictions of World Capitalism and the Working Class," Spravochnik-1984, pp 48, 57. See also: V. V. Zagladin, A. A. Galkin, B. I. Koval' and T. T. Timofeyev: "The Working Class and the Development of the Worldwide Revolutionary Process," Spravochnik-1982; (O. Reyngold) (GDR), "Aggravation of the General Crisis of Capitalism and the Economic Situation in Western Europe in the 1970's," Yezhegodnik-1980; P. N. Fedoseyev, "A Most Important Factor of Social Development; (M. Shmidt) (GDR), "New Level in the Deepening of the General Crisis of Capitalism," Yezhegodnik-1982; A. B. Veber, "Production Relations Under Capitalism and the Workers' Movement;" (A. Zorgel') (FRG), "The Crisis of Social Policy in the FRG;" (A. Khaonkasalo) (Finland), "Technological Development and Working Conditions," Yezhegodnik-1984.
13. See: "Transnational Firms and the Working Class Struggle," Yezhegodnik-1980; T. T. Timofeyev, Transnational Firms and the New Conditions of the Working Class Struggle," Yezhegodnik-1982.
14. Besides general theoretical articles in which the tendencies of its development are interpreted, see also specialized publications on this topic: S. V. Mikhaylov, "Technological Advances and the Dynamic of Employment in Manufacturing (Based on the Example of Great Britain)," Yezhegodnik-1983; S. V. Mikhaylov, "Unemployed Persons With Higher Education (Based on the Examples of the U. S. and Great Britain)," Yezhegodnik-1984.
15. See Ye. N. Starikov, "Declasse Strata in the Social Structure of Capitalist Countries." On the specific aspects of this problem see M. E.

Kramarov and S. V. Mikhaylov, "National Ethnic Minorities in Contemporary British Society," Yezhegodnik-1982.

16. The publication of varied and substantive articles in recent editions is clearly indicative of the attention which is constantly paid to these problems in both editions: In the Spravochnik-1984 -- Yu. A. Zhilin, "The Socialist International in Search of an Answer to the Problems of Our Time;" in the Yezhegodnik-1983 -- G. G. Dilogenskiy, "On the Social Foundations of the Ideology and Policy of Contemporary Social Democracy," and S. I. Velikovskiy, "The Left Wing of the French Socialists (1971-1981)."

17. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 10, p 19.

18. See: S. I. Velikovskiy, "The Culture of the Working Class. Toward a More Precise Definition of the Field of Research;" (J. Krossik) (Great Britain), "The Culture of the Working Class and the Culture of the Middle Strata in the Victorian Era," Yezhegodnik-1982; A. A. Galkin, "The Phenomenon of Political Culture as a Factor in Understanding Social Movements," Yezhegodnik-1983; Yu. P. Mador and G. M. Mereminskiy, "Working Class Culture in Bourgeois Society and the Ideological Struggle," Yezhegodnik-1984.

19. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 25, p 9.

20. Ibid., Vol 30, p 102.

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Table of Contents, No 2, March-April 1985

TOWARDS THE 27TH CPSU CONGRESS

An Important Part of Ideological Work (pp 7-19) (V. S. Stepanov)
(not translated).....

The Working Class as the Object of Scientific Research (pp 20-32)
(not translated).....

THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GREAT VICTORY

The Decisive Contribution of the USSR to the Defeat of Fascism
(pp 33-46) (V. M. Kulish).....

The Role of the Working Class in the Victory Over Fascism
(pp 47-59) (T. Vladimirov) (not translated).....

IN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

The Drawing Together of the Union Republics' Working Class at the
Stage of Developed Socialism in the USSR (pp 60-67)
(V. A. Stukalov) (not translated).....

STRUGGLE OF IDEAS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

Conservatism: Theory and Practice of "Social Revanchism" (pp 68-79)
(A. A. Galkin).....

PROBLEMS AND JUDGMENTS

"Centers of Power:" Doctrine and Reality (80-89) (A. Ye. Bovin,
V. P. Lukin).....

CLASS STRUGGLE IN THE DEVELOPED CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

The Principles of Alliance Politics in Democratic Movements
(pp 90-100) (W. Gerns) (not translated).....

The Socio-Political Struggle in Present-Day France (pp 101-116)
(I. M. Bunin).....

CAPITALISM AGAINST THE WORKING PEOPLE

FRG: The Employment Crisis and Youth (pp 117-127) (Ye. P. Glazova)
(not translated).....

TRADE UNIONS IN TODAY'S WORLD

U. S. Trade Unions and the 1984 Election Campaign (pp 128-140)
(M. I. Lapitzky) (not translated).....

Structure of Hired Labor in Peru and the Problem of Trade Union Unity
(pp 141-148) (P. V. Tulayev) (not translated).....

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY TODAY

British Laborites at the Crossroads (pp 149-162) (S. A. Chernetzky)
(not translated).....

REPORTS

Urban Ecology as a Sphere of Social Activity (pp 163-166)
(Ye. S. Shomina) (not translated).....

The Struggle in Weimar Germany Over the Enterprise Councils Law
(166-172) (I. D. Chigrin) (not translated).....

BOOK REVIEWS

At the Sharp Edge of the Ideological Struggle (Review of the Reference:
"Mezhdunarodnoye rabocheye dvizheniye" [International Workers'
Movement] and the Annual: "Rabochiy klass v mirovom
revolyutsionnom protsesse" [The Working Class in the Worldwide
Revolutionary Process]) (pp 173-178) (M. Aparnikov).....

Social Reformism: Political Economy and Economic Policy (Review of
"Mezhdunarodnaya ekonomicheskaya teoriya i praktika sotsial-
reformizma" [International Economic Theory and Practice of
Social Reformism] by L. I. Piyasheva) (pp 178-182)
(Yu. A. Borko) (not translated).....

A Biography of Palmiro Togliatti (Review of "Pal'miro Tol'yatti.
Ocherk zhizni i deyatel'nosti" [Palmiro Togliatti. Outline of
His Life and Activity] by N. P. Komolova and G. S. Filatov)
(pp 182-184) (I. B. Levin) (not translated).....

Formation of Revolutionary Consciousness: Historical Experience and
the Present (Review of "Revolutsionnyy protsess i
revolyutsionnoye soznaniye" [The Revolutionary Process and
Revolutionary Consciousness] by Ye. G. Plimak) (pp 184-188)
(I. M. Klyamkin) (not translated).....

Books in Brief (Review of "Kontseptsii vzaimodeystviya ekonomiki i
prirody" [Concepts of the Interaction of Economics and Nature]
by V. F. Bartov and V. V. Sedov, and of "Sotsialisticheskiy
vybor v afrike i ideologicheskaya bor'ba" [The Socialist
Choice in Africa and the Ideological Struggle] by A. A. Ivanov)
(pp 188-190) (A. P. Andreyev) (not translated).....

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CSO: 1807/0336

- END -